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ABSTRACT 
!
People often find it difficult to make decisions and are likely to defer their choices in 
the absence of an obvious best solution.  Choice deferral potentially brings an alteration of the 
availability of the options in the choice set. Whereas a considerable amount of research has 
been directed at added options, little attention has been paid to the case of lost options. 
In this thesis I investigate (a) the cognitive processes that follow the exclusion of an 
option from a set of options and (b) how these processes affect the evaluation of the 
remaining options and the choice among them. Building on research on asymmetric 
comparisons, the first central assumption of a newly developed theoretical model claims that 
the excluded option serves as a standard for the evaluation of the remaining options. In order 
to be selected as a standard of comparison in the evaluations of the remaining options, the 
excluded option should increase in cognitive accessibility due to the exclusion.  The second 
central assumption is that the consequences of the exclusion depend on the valence of the 
salient features of the excluded option: For salient negative features, the model predicts a 
general increase of attractiveness of the remaining options and a preference for the option 
most dissimilar to the excluded option. For salient positive (?) features of the excluded option, 
however, the model predicts a general decrease of attractiveness of the remaining options and 
a preference for the most similar option.  
A series of experiments was conducted to test the central assumptions of our 
theoretical model. The increased cognitive accessibility hypothesis was tested in two studies 
employing an incidental memory task after the exclusion of an option from a choice set. 
Results indicate that the features of the excluded option are more likely to be recall and 
therefore more accessible than features of the remaining options. The salient feature 
hypothesis regarding the predicted effects of the exclusion on the evaluation of the remaining 
options was supported in a third study showing that the change in attractiveness of the 
 "#!
remaining options depends on whether the positive or the negative features are especially 
salient. In addition, the choice between the remaining options was affected by the exclusion in 
the predicted way. The discussion integrates the presented theoretical account and empirical 
findings into the context of other research areas such as too-much choice and the selection of 
goals. Finally, practical implications of this research are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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Introduction 
Choice is a central part of human life. The life path of an individual can be narrated as 
a line of smaller and bigger decisions he or she takes, opportunities he or she selects, and 
alternatives he or she fails to pursue. As of early childhood, however, we learn that we cannot 
always have what we want. Our choices are often limited and we have to learn to choose 
within given constraints. The interplay between constraints and self-determination is a 
delicate equilibrium that varies along an individual’s life span (e.g., Freund, Nikitin, & Ritter, 
2009), but also between cultures and societies (e.g., Hui & Villareal, 1989; Oishi, Diener, 
Lucas, & Suh, 1999).  
Traditionally, psychological research has focused on the benefits of personal choice 
(Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, & Deci, 1978). More recently, 
however, attention has also been directed at the costs and downsides of choice (e.g., Botti & 
Iyengar, 2006; Schwartz, 2000). In particular, an abundance of alternatives has been shown to 
entail negative consequences for the person who has to make the decision (Sheena S. Iyengar 
& Lepper, 2000; Sheena S. Iyengar & Lepper, 2002; Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz & Ward, 
2004; Schwartz et al., 2002).  
This thesis focuses on a very specific question in the context of choice and its 
limitations, namely, on the consequences of restricting choice. How do we react if we lose an 
option that was previously available? What if, while we are still pondering about which meal 
to choose in a restaurant, the waiter tells us that one of the options is not available today? 
What if we learn that one of the movies we are considering going to see is sold out before we 
have made up our mind to go or not? Or, while we are still trying up to make our mind, which 
subject we want to study, we hear that for one the subjects the application deadline has 
already passed? How does this affect our perception of the remaining options and our 
decision-making? 
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In order to find an answer to these questions, I will adopt an informational perspective 
(Mussweiler, 2003a) in this thesis in order to investigate the cognitive consequences of 
restricting choice. In the following section, I will provide a brief introduction to this 
perspective and discuss the central constructs of this thesis. 
General Theoretical Perspective and Assumptions 
This thesis adopts a constructivist and contextual view of judgment and decision-
making. In short, this means that our evaluations and choices are not based on an internal 
master list that we consult when facing a decision. Rather, we use the information that is 
accessible to us in the decision situation and construct a judgment. In the following, I will 
outline several basic assumptions that characterize this position.  
People are neither completely rational nor do they process all the information 
available when making a decision. Rather, people are selective with information due to their 
limited processing capacities and they adapt to the specific situation and the demands of the 
context (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 
2003). 
In a decision situation, people form mental representations of the options they have. 
Those mental representations are based on whatever information comes to mind at the 
moment of their construal. The likelihood with which something comes to mind is generally 
referred to as cognitive accessibility (Higgins, 1996). In any given situation, it is the specific 
situation as well as the personal goals and other personal variables (e.g., beliefs, motives, 
emotions) that determine which information comes to mind (cf., Schwarz, 2009). The 
knowledge base, that is, the total information on the options available to the person – from 
memory and perceptual input – is generally much more abundant than the formed 
representations and therefore only selective information is included in the representations.  
The selection and integration of information serves to provide the basis for a sound 
judgment in a specific situation. In other words, the information is selected in accordance 
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with the goals of the decision-maker. For example, people draw on different information 
depending on whether their goal is to select one of two options or to reject one of two options 
(Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). They also draw on different information depending on 
whether the options are located in the near or distant future (Liberman & Trope, 2003).  
However, not only meaningful but also haphazard conditions can influence the 
selective integration of information. Priming experiments have demonstrated how judgments 
are suggestible to temporal-preceding, unrelated input (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979). Different 
forms of presentation of the same information have also been shown to influence or even 
reverse judgments (framing effect, e.g., P. Slovic, 1995; P. Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).1 Moreover, research on the anchoring paradigm has produced 
numerous examples of how contextual cues influence judgment, even when people know that 
the contextual information is produced by chance or should be discarded (Gretchen B. 
Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Kahneman, 1992; Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997; Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Consider the example of a 
judge who is deliberating about the suitable sentence for a criminal (cf., Englich, Mussweiler, 
& Strack, 2006). If this judge receives a call from a journalist asking whether the sentence 
will be more or less than three years, the information of three years should not affect the 
formation of the judgment. Unfortunately, however, it does (Englich et al., 2006).  
In summary, judgments and decisions are conceived as constructive processes that are 
responsive to a person’s goals and to the social and physical context. Selecting information is 
a flexible and sensitive process that is normally functionally related to the given situation but, 
due to its flexibility, is also open to irrelevant or even unwanted influences. 
The elements of the representation of options are referred to as features. According to 
Tversky (1977, p. 329), features “may correspond to components such as eyes or mouth; they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Note, however, that the framing of a decision can interact with the motivational orientation of the decision 
maker. Different frames can elicit diverging goals, in respect to which the reversed judgment is again 
meaningful. 
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may represent concrete properties such as size or color; and they may reflect abstract 
attributes such as quality or complexity.” Options might share common features (e.g., 
weight), in which case the feature refers to the specific value of this attribute (e.g., 100 kg or 
“very heavy”). They might also apply only to specific options. In the process of decision-
making, the features of the option are matched and compared (Tversky, 1972). Again, not 
necessarily all the features are involved in this process – sometimes people base their decision 
only on one feature (cf., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). In addition, not all features are 
normally given the same importance in the decision-making process. Particular features might 
be accentuated because of their relation to the goals of the person in the decision situation. 
They might also be accentuated on account of the conditions of the specific decision situation, 
as described above.  
In the following, I will briefly outline how this perspective is applied to the case of a 
restriction of choice within the scope of this thesis. The three central parts of this thesis 
comprise the development of a theoretical model (Part I) and the empirical testing of its main 
assumptions (Parts II and III). 
Part I: Asymmetric Comparison in Choice Processes 
Part I of this thesis starts off by taking a broader look at comparisons in choice 
situations. The aim of this first part is to apply a core finding in similarity research on for 
choices between multiple options. Similarity research has established the notion that 
comparison processes between two objects are directional. That is, it makes a difference 
whether A is compared to B or B to A, with A and B being two objects whose similarity is to 
be judged. This notion contrasts with former conceptions of similarity in mostly geometrical 
terms that placed the two objects in some coordinate space (cf., Tversky, 1977). The 
directionality of comparisons implicates that the two objects being compared have diverging 
roles. The one role is often labeled “target” and the other one “standard” or “referent”. 
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Reversing the assignment of the objects of comparison to the two roles leads to differences in 
the resulting judgment.  
Part I reviews several influential models that address these differences and explore the 
role of target and standard in comparisons. Next to the seminal contrast model of Tversky 
(1977), Ortony’s (1979) referent model, and the structural alignment approach (Gentner & 
Markman, 1997) are discussed and elaborated with respect to their commonalities and 
differences. The aim of this literature review is to establish a clear conception of the roles of 
target and standard. We then address the question of how these roles affect comparisons in 
choices. Some researchers applied the idea of asymmetric comparison to choices between two 
options (e.g., Houston, Sherman, & Baker, 1989). In Part I, we extend this application to 
choices between multiple options and formulate a hypothesis about general conditions under 
which asymmetric comparisons play a role in such decisions. 
As a paradigmatic case for such conditions, we discuss the exclusion of one option 
from a set of options. We develop a process model – hereinafter referred to as an 
Accentuation Model – that spells out the cognitive consequences of restricting choice in this 
way. Underpinning this model is the idea that the exclusion of an option increases the 
cognitive accessibility of this option, which in turn makes it the preferred standard of 
comparison for the remaining options. The role of the standard is then to accentuate features 
within the remaining options. From this model we derive predictions for two different kinds 
of judgments people might form when choosing between several options. People make an 
absolute judgment about the attractiveness of each of the options and they form a preference 
judgment in which they evaluate the relative attractiveness of each option compared to the 
other options in order to make a choice.  
The subsequent parts of this thesis will then aim to provide empirical evidence for the 
central assumption of the model (Part II) and its predictions concerning evaluations and 
choices (Part III). 
INTRODUCTION 
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Part II: Keeping in mind what you cannot have: Cognitive perseverance of lost options 
Part II of this thesis addresses the first assumption of this model, namely the increase 
in accessibility of an option after this option has been excluded from a choice set. This 
assumption is placed in a broader context of the influence of allegedly irrelevant past events 
on decisions. In a rational perspective on decisions, lost options are irrelevant for the decision 
when they are unrelated to the outcome of the decision. On many occasions, however, people 
display a suggestibility to past events in their decisions and judgments. We propose a 
cognitive rationale as to why this might be the case – at least for the instance of the excluded 
option. 
Part II builds an argument based on general cognitive principles as to why excluding 
an option should yield an increase in the accessibility of that option. We then present two 
experiments that test this prediction. In the first experiment, participants are presented with a 
hypothetical choice between three cars, whereas in the second experiment, participants have 
an actual choice between three cups, one of which they would actually receive as a gift. In 
both experiments an incidental memory task is employed to test the accessibility of the 
features of the options. 
Part III: Consequences of a restriction of choice: Shifting evaluations and choices 
Part III of this thesis looks at the predictions derived from the Accentuation Model 
with regard to the evaluation of the remaining options and the choice among the remaining 
options. The Accentuation Model developed in Part I makes specific predictions about the 
consequences of restricting choice. The restriction is assumed to affect the general level of 
attractiveness of the choice alternatives, that is, the absolute judgments about each alternative. 
The restriction is also assumed to affect the choice of one of the alternatives, that is, the 
relative or preferential judgment. Part III examines two experiments that focus on these two 
different judgments.  
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In the first experiment, participants have a choice between several word puzzles, one 
of which they are to select with a view to solving. Before making their choice, they are asked 
to evaluate each of the options individually. After these initial evaluations, one of the options 
is randomly excluded. Participants are then asked to evaluate the two remaining options 
again. In the second experiment, a student sample is asked to choose between three different 
courses. Again, one course is excluded before participants make their choice. In this study, it 
is interesting to note how the exclusion affects the participants’ choices of the remaining 
options.  
General discussion 
The results of Parts II and III are summarized in the general discussion. The empirical 
evidence is evaluated with regard to the theoretical assumptions from Part I. Moreover, the 
Accentuation Model is situated in the context of other related research areas, which throws up 
an array of further-reaching questions and future research ideas. 
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 Abstract 
Since Tversky’s (1977) seminal paper on asymmetric comparisons was published, 
comparisons of different options are generally believed to be directional. Interestingly, the 
asymmetry involved in comparisons has not been considered systematically for choices 
between different options. This paper argues that, in decision situations, one of the options 
serves as a dominant standard against which the others are evaluated, which results in 
asymmetric comparisons and, in turn, has important and systematic consequences for the 
choice process. This paper outlines which conditions should result in asymmetric 
comparisons. Taking existing models of asymmetric comparisons into account, a process 
model will be presented using the loss of a previously available choice option as an example.  
 
!
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Introduction 
Imagine that you want to buy a new CD player. You walk into an electronics store, 
find the CD player section, and compare the different models with respect to technical 
features and design. You compare them all until you find the one that best fits your needs. 
Now imagine a different situation in which a certain CD player is on display at the electronics 
store with all the advantages of this model highlighted in the display. After taking a close look 
at the promotional display, you compare the promoted model to alternative models. Would 
the comparisons you made in the second situation be equivalent to those made in the first 
situation? Would your choice be the same? In this paper, we argue that the comparison 
processes in the two situations would be structurally different and, more precisely, that 
comparisons made in the second situation would be based on information acquired from the 
display about the promoted model.  
Based on the assumption that comparison processes and decision processes share 
many similarities (Dhar, Nowlis, & Sherman, 1999; Medin, Goldstone, & Markman, 1995), 
we have adopted a theoretical perspective stemming from research on comparison processes 
or, more specifically, on asymmetric comparisons, to analyze the situation described above. 
We argue that the different options in a choice set are not weighted equally in certain 
situations. Instead, one of the options serves as a standard of comparison for evaluating the 
other options. The central consequence of this asymmetry is a differential salience of specific 
aspects (e.g., attributes or dimensions) of the options, which in turn affects the importance of 
this information for the decision process. After providing some background information about 
the relevance ofcomparison processes for decision-making, we will review extant models of 
asymmetric comparisons and then elaborate on the boundary conditions under which 
asymmetric comparisons are likely to play a role in choices between options. Using the 
example of the situation in which a previously available option is excluded from the decision 
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process, we will show how asymmetric comparisons might affect the valence of the 
remaining options.  
Evaluation, comparison, and choice 
There is an ongoing debate in literature on social judgments and decision making 
about whether attitude (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Schwarz, 2007) and preferences (e.g., 
Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Simonson, 2008) are stable and inherent to the person or 
constructive and dependent on the given situation. Conclusive empirical evidence that 
evaluations and preferences are context-sensitive would contradict the idea of a fixed internal 
master list of preferences that people have stored in their memory and consult whenever they 
make decisions (for an overview, see Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 
2006). Aspects of the decision situation and the choice options affect judgment to a large 
extent. Among such determinants are those that belong to the “inner context” of the person 
making the judgment (e.g., his or her goals or mood) as well as characteristics of the 
evaluation situation (e.g., number of options, sequence and form of option presentation, 
response format).  
A classic example of the susceptibility of judgments to situational parameters is the 
anchoring effect (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Wilson et al., 1996). Anchoring values can be 
any values that people pick from the context of the judgment and use as reference points for 
their judgment. The anchoring effect was nicely demonstrated in a study by Englich, 
Mussweiler, and Strack (2006). Legal professionals were asked to provide a sentencing 
decision for a hypothetical criminal case based on realistic case material comprised of 
information typically provided in actual court cases. The manipulation consisted of an 
imaginary phone conversation in which a journalist asked the judges whether they thought the 
sentence would be higher or lower than one year (low-anchor group) or three years (high-
anchor group). The anchor had a significant influence: Participants in the high-anchor group 
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gave considerably higher sentences than those in the low-anchor group. Anchoring effects can 
even occur when the anchor is not processed consciously (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005). 
Simple priming can also influence judgments. In a recent study, Critcher and Gilovic 
(2008) asked participants to judge the likelihood of failure for a particular player in a football 
match. The stimulus materials included the player’s professional record and a photo of him 
during a match. The materials for the two experimental groups differed only in the player’s 
jersey number in the photo (54 for one group, 94 for the other). Judgments showed a clear 
influence of this arbitrary contextual information, the group presented with the higher jersey 
number judging the likelihood of failure to be greater. Thus, priming with a higher number, 
even when entirely irrelevant to the judgment at hand, seems to raise estimates of likelihood. 
This research demonstrates that people base their judgments on contextual 
information, even if it is entirely irrelevant to the judgment at hand. Furthermore, this 
research also exemplifies the relativity of judgments and evaluations. In evaluating a target or 
forming a judgment, we do so with reference to a relevant – or even irrelevant – standard. We 
use a mental grid specifying the relevant dimension(s) and a reference point to position an 
item. This process appears to be so basic that contextual information enters the process even 
in situations in which people possess a well-established cognitive script for making judgments 
(as in the example with the legal professionals). Judgments and evaluations, then, always 
involve a comparison of existing or construed alternatives (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Mussweiler, 2003b). The comparison has a considerable impact on the resulting judgment. 
What constitutes a choice situation? For one, there must be at least two options. The 
set of options, one could argue, provides the most immediate and highly relevant and salient 
context for the evaluation of each option. One of these options is likely to serve as a standard 
of comparison against which the other options are compared (Tversky, 1972). To exemplify 
the consequences of the presence of a comparison standard more generally, let us first 
consider two examples of situations in which standards are made explicit.  
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Nobel laureate Herbert Simon (1955) introduced the idea that, due to various internal 
(e.g. cognitive capacities) and external (e.g. temporal resources) constraints, people are not 
able to consider all possible options and their probable consequences in order to make optimal 
decisions. Instead, they “satisfice,” stopping their search for a solution when they find one 
that is satisfactory. They evaluate the available options with respect to a pre-established 
satisfaction level and end the information-gathering process when an option meets (or 
exceeds) that level. However, the aspired level of satisfaction is also malleable: If a solution 
that exceeds the aspired level of satisfaction is found very easily, the aspiration level might be 
increased; conversely, if it proves difficult to find a solution, the aspiration level might be 
decreased.  
Tversky’s (1972) elimination-by-aspects model is also an example of explicit 
standards used in decision making. This model assumes that options from a finite set of 
options are sequentially eliminated. In each round of the comparison process, one feature is 
selected as being necessary and options that do not possess that feature are eliminated. 
In both examples, the available options are considered with respect to a given standard 
and aspects of the options that do not form part of the standard are ignored. Thus, the explicit 
standards in these examples fulfill a twofold role. First, they signal which aspects of the 
options are to be considered. Second, they provide a point of reference against which the 
aspects of the options are evaluated. In this paper, we stress these functional properties of 
standards and argue that they pervade any context in which standards are involved. 
In decision making, however, standards are not necessarily explicit. As research by 
Houston and colleagues (Houston, Sherman, & Baker, 1991) shows, standards can also be 
constructed on the basis of information about all of the given options. That is, an ideal 
standard can be assembled from positive features of all the options (or, an anti-ideal standard 
from negative features of all the options). As we will discuss in more detail below, one option 
can also serve as a standard against which the others are compared. 
PART 1: ASYMMETRIC COMPARISON IN CHOICE 
 
15!
Similarity and choice  
Similarity judgments and choices are strongly intertwined. For a preference judgment, 
people have to establish a rank order of available options. That is difficult to do when options 
are very similar (Medin et al., 1995) or very dissimilar (Gentner & Markman, 1994). 
Similarity judgments, however, do not only affect the way people rank preferences. In their 
review on parallel phenomena in similarity and decision processes, Medin and colleagues 
(1995) provided convincing evidence that similarity judgments and decision making share 
basic cognitive processes. The assumption that these two types of processes bear similarities 
bolsters adoption of the strategy to apply theories, models, and empirical findings established 
in one domain to the other and should ultimately lead to an integration of the fields in 
research and theorizing. We now turn to an intriguing field within similarity research, namely, 
asymmetric comparison. We will review central theoretical and empirical work on 
asymmetric comparison, discuss the application of asymmetric comparison to choice 
situations, and propose a more extensive application of this theoretical perspective.  
Asymmetric comparisons 
In comparing two objects, it is generally assumed that people represent the objects as 
assemblies of features and the relations between those features (Tversky, 1977). For instance, 
a CD player might be represented by sound quality, price, and technical configuration. Note 
that comparisons typically do not entail a representation of all features of the different objects 
as this would, in most cases, result in a matrix too complex to handle cognitively. In any 
comparison, only a subset of features enters the comparison matrix. Moreover, features that 
are relevant to the comparison are more likely to enter into the comparison matrix. The 
relevance of a feature, in turn, depends largely on the goal of the judgment. For instance, 
comparing two people with respect to how well they are suited for a clerical position will 
yield a very different representation than when the goal is to determine which is older. 
However, as we will explain later, the relevance of a feature and thereby its impact on the 
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comparison is also affected by rather arbitrary characteristics of the comparison situation such 
as the order of presentation and the prominence of the objects involved. The result of a 
comparison process, then, not only depends on the features of the objects, but also on whether 
those features are used for the comparison and if they are perceived as relevant to the 
judgment at hand. The very process of comparing different options, then, might lead to 
different perceptions of the relevant comparison dimensions depending upon the options in 
the comparison set. Moreover, the same features of a given object might be evaluated 
differently depending on the available comparison objects. In fact, one of the central issues in 
comparison research is to explain the choice of comparison dimensions and the evaluation of 
features of the objects in the comparison set. As will be shown below, changing the order of 
the objects of comparison can illuminate the issue of the relevant comparison dimensions.  
In his influential paper, Tversky (1977) pointed out that the directionality of a 
comparison affects judgments. In a classic study on directionality, one group of participants 
was asked to compare North Korea to Red China and the other group to compare Red China 
to North Korea. The similarity of North Korea and Red China was found to be higher in the 
first condition than in the second (Mussweiler, 2001a; Tversky, 1977). In the first condition, 
the position of North Korea represented the target (often also called “subject”) of comparison 
and Red China the standard (also often called the “base” or “referent”). The perceived 
similarity is therefore higher with Red China as the standard and North Korea as the target 
than vice versa. The effect of the directionality of a comparison is also manifest in the 
preference for a certain order of making comparisons. In general, people prefer to compare 
the less prominent item to the more prominent item or, in other words, to compare the variant 
to the prototype (Bowdle & Gentner, 1997; Tversky, 1977). Thus, target and standard play 
different roles in the comparison process. Although there is much agreement in the literature 
on this point, theories differ with respect to their assumptions on the specific roles of target 
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and standard. In the following section, we will review some prominent theoretical accounts of 
this question.  
Contrast Model 
According to Tversky’s (1977) contrast model, similarity judgments are based on 
three different feature sets that result from a process aimed at establishing a match between 
features of two comparison objects, A and B: unique features of A, features shared by A and 
B, and unique features of B. Unique features are conceived of as decreasing similarity, shared 
features as enhancing similarity. According to Tversky’s focusing hypothesis, in similarity 
judgments, features of the target will be given more weight than features of the standard. The 
distinctive or unique features of the target – features that are not matched by the standard –
reduce perceived similarity more than the unique features of the standard do. According to the 
contrast model, similarity is primarily determined by the size of the set of unique features of 
the target as compared to the size of the set of features shared by both objects.  
The size of the set of unique features is assumed to depend on the prominence of an 
object. The more prominent an object, the greater the number of features that are accessible 
for comparison. Thus, more prominent objects have a larger set of unique features than less 
prominent objects do. Similarity will therefore be lower when the prominent object serves as 
the target and higher when the less prominent serves as the target of comparison. Although 
the unique features of the standard are not ignored, they are assumed to play a minor role in 
similarity judgments. Thus, asymmetries result from the differential weighting of the 
distinctive features of the target and those of the standard.  
Referent Model 
Ortony’s (1979) referent model extended and modified Tversky’s contrast model. He 
proposed that the crucial element in asymmetric comparisons is the relative salience of the 
matching features in the two comparison objects. Directional asymmetries arise because 
people prefer the matched feature to be more salient in the standard than in the target. This 
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means that people tend to use as a standard of comparison the object that has the more 
extreme value or that is more typical with respect to a given feature (e.g., honey would 
probably be preferred as the standard in comparisons of orange marmalade and honey with 
respect to sweetness). Therefore, asymmetries in directional comparisons might also result 
from differences in the set of common features (see alsoAguilar & Medin, 1999). The 
prominent object is presumably also more structured (Bowdle & Gentner, 1997; Gentner & 
Bowdle, 1994)(Bowdle & Gentner, 1997; Gentner & Bowdle, 1994), which makes it a good 
standard for generating relevant comparison dimensions. In this perspective, the size of the 
common feature set depends on the prominence of the standard: The more information 
available about the standard, the more matches possible in the feature-matching process. 
From Ortony’s perspective, directional comparisons yield asymmetries because the generated 
comparison-relevant knowledge primarily depends on the standard.  
This account differs in three relevant ways from the contrast model: First, Tversky’s 
(1977) focusing hypothesis posits that people naturally focus on the target. From Ortony’s 
perspective, the standard serves as the primary source of information for the comparison 
process. Second, in the contrast model, asymmetries result from differences in the set of 
option-unique features. In Ortony’s referent model, asymmetries stem from different sets of 
common features. Third, the referent model assumes that different directions in the 
comparison process also lead to different feature sets. In contrast, Tversky’s contrast model 
posits that both comparison directions yield the same comparison information; thus, the three 
feature sets (unique to A, shared by A and B, unique to B) are invariant to direction. What 
differs as a function of the comparison direction in this model is the relative salience of the 
unique feature sets.  
Structural Alignment 
The role of the standard is also highlighted in structural alignment model (Gentner & 
Markman, 1997). This account stresses the process of alignment, in other words, how the 
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correspondence between the objects of comparison are established. Gentner’s (1983, 1989) 
structure-mapping theory originally focused on analogy. Analogy and similarity, however, are 
seen as equivalent with respect to the information processing involved (Bowdle & Gentner, 
1997; Gentner & Markman, 1997). This account goes beyond the feature perspective in that it 
considers the relations between the features as well as the structure that forms these relations 
(i.e., the hierarchy of mental representations). For instance, in comparing two pictures, it is 
not only the presence of identical elements (e.g., a tree and an apple) that contribute to 
similarity, but also whether the elements are related to each other in the same way (e.g., the 
apple falling from the tree vs. the apple thrown at the tree). The comparison process is 
assumed to proceed by aligning and mapping these structures.  
The central factor determining what information is considered for the comparison is 
systematicity. Systematicity is defined as the presence of higher-order connections between 
lower-order relations (Bowdle & Gentner, 1997; Gentner & Markman, 1997). The 
systematicity imbalance hypothesis states that people prefer to map from the more coherent 
and systematic item onto the less systematic item because the comparison process aims at 
establishing the maximally consistent match. When the direction of comparison is 
experimentally assigned, the informativity exhibited by the comparison directions varies. 
People draw more information from a comparison when the standard is the more systematic 
object. After matching the structures, the standard provides candidate inferences for potential 
features of the target. That is, due to congruent structures, features of the standard are inferred 
to be equally present in the target. Thus, information is projected from the standard to the 
target. Similarity here is not only a function of objects’ features, but also of the concordance 
of their role within the relational structure of the objects.  
Comparison asymmetries in this approach are explained by the directional 
informativity hypothesis: Different comparison directions yield different numbers of 
candidate inferences on the basis of structural completion (Markman & Gentner, 1993). To 
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illustrate, let us return to the example of the comparison between North Korea and China. 
Here, a candidate inference could be that since China is a Communist state with restricted 
freedom of speech and since North Korea is also a Communist state, that North Korea has 
equally restricted freedom of speech. Thus, asymmetries typically arise due to differences in 
the systematicity of the objects being compared (Bowdle & Gentner, 1997; Gentner & 
Bowdle, 1994). Comparisons with the more systematic object as the standard maximizes the 
amount of information projected from the standard to the target. Some empirical evidence in 
support of Bowdle and Gentner’s (1997) hypothesis exists. Participants in their study read 
vignettes with various degrees of causal coherence. They then consistently preferred 
comparisons in which the more coherent passage was the standard and the less coherent 
passage the target. They also made more inferences from the more coherent passage to the 
less coherent one. Finally, they rated comparisons to more coherent standards as being more 
informative than the reverse comparisons. According to this perspective, the standard carries 
the main weight in establishing which of the features enter the comparison process because it 
is posited to provide the informational basis. In other words, people use information about the 
standard to detect and generate information about the target. When people are free to choose 
the direction of comparison, they use the object that is higher in systematicity and coherence 
as the standard.  
What can be concluded from this review of the three dominant models of asymmetric 
comparisons? The asymmetries in comparisons demonstrate that judgments strongly depend 
on what information is processed during the comparison process. More specifically, they 
show that judgments differ as a function of the assignment of items to the roles of standard 
and target. As the properties of these roles and their impact on the comparison process are 
highly relevant for the purpose of this paper, we will summarize the different views.  
We use the term “comparison stage” to refer to the information actually used in the 
formation of a judgment. Relevant for the comparison stage is which of the two objects is the 
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primary source of information. The matching process needs some initial information. 
Tversky’s model is mute with regard to how feature matching is established (i.e., the process 
that results in the sets of unique and shared features). This means that his model does not 
assume a primary search direction. The contrast model assumes that there is no effect of 
direction of comparison on the comparison stage. The three sets of features (unique to A, 
shared by A and B, and unique to B) are seen as invariant to the conditions under which the 
objects are compared. In contrast, the structural-mapping account (Gentner & Markman, 
1994) and Ortony’s (1979) perspective make an explicit assumption concerning how direction 
information is primarily processed in the comparison process. They draw on linguistic bases 
of comparisons as an argument for their assumption. According to Grice’s (1975) 
communication maxim of informativity, people expect utterances to be informative. An 
utterance is informative when the given information precedes new information, a rule that is 
also known as the “given-new contract” (Clark & Haviland, 1977). Therefore, the standard is 
supposed to provide relevant information about the target. People make use of information 
they have about the standard to elicit knowledge about the target. This argument is especially 
plausible for specific forms of comparisons like metaphors, similes (Ortony, Von Druska, 
Foss, & Jones, 1985), and analogies (Gentner & Markman, 1997). Research by Medin aet al. 
(1995) also supports the assumption that different information is processed in a comparison 
process depending on the assignment of the roles of target and standard, and that the 
activation of knowledge that enters the comparison stage is dominated by the standard. 
In self-other comparisons, the self functions as the habitual standard (Srull & Gaelick, 
1983; J. B. White, 2008). If the direction of comparison is experimentally assigned, the more 
elaborated self-knowledge leads to asymmetries in similarity judgments (Hodges, Bruininks, 
& Ivy, 2002; Karylowski, 1989; Karylowski & Skarzynska, 1992). Due to the self-
involvement, such comparisons are highly susceptible to affective and motivational variables 
like the general valuation of the other person (Hodges, 2005). 
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Asymmetric Comparison in Choice 
Applying the perspective of asymmetric comparison to the realm of choices, Houston, 
Sherman, and Baker (1989) found direction-of-comparison effects in choices between two 
objects (cars, vacations, apartments, college courses) due to sequential presentation of the 
options. They hypothesized that when options are presented one after the other, the focus will 
generally lie on the second option, making its features salient in the comparison process. They 
designed options equal in general attractiveness that had either shared positive features (e.g., 
option A: cheerful, option B: cheerful) and unique negative features (e.g., option A: boastful, 
option B: lazy) or shared negative features (e.g., option A: boastful, option B: boastful) and 
unique positive features (e.g., option A: cheerful, option B: considerate). Following the 
rationale of the cancellation and focus model proposed by these authors, the shared features 
should be cancelled out in the comparison process because they do not provide discriminative 
value. The unique features of the second option – the focal option – should determine the 
preference. Houston et al. (1989) argued that the focal option serves as the starting point for 
the comparison process. The information available about the focal option is mapped onto the 
other option, either finding a match or not. Accordingly, in their study, when pairs of unique-
positive options were presented, participants were expected to select the second option 
whereas for unique-negative options they were expected to select the first option. Results 
confirmed these predictions. Houston, Sherman and Baker (1991) replicated these findings 
and, in addition, showed that the direction-of-comparison effect was due to sequential 
presentation. When the different options were presented side by side, neither option was in 
the focus of comparison. Moreover, in this presentation format, no preference reversals were 
found between unique-positive and unique-negative pairs (Houston & Sherman, 1995). 
The studies of Houston et al. showed that asymmetric comparisons influence the 
choice between two options. Whenever one option is in the focus of a comparison, the salient 
features of this option will guide the comparison process (Dhar et al., 1999; Dhar & 
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Simonson, 1992; Kardes & Sanbonmatsu, 1993). This guiding can be regarded as a 
highlighting or accentuating of the salient features of the standard, giving them more weight 
in the preference construction. For example, Dhar et al. (1999) asked participants to make 
first a directional comparison between two options before giving a preference rating (study 1). 
Results revealed a clear preference in favor of the focal option when the both options were 
generally attractive and a preference in favor of the non-focal option when both options were 
generally unattractive. However, the mechanism that turns one option into the standard of 
comparison is not limited to sequential presentation. As studies on similarity show, other 
variables such as differences between options in prominence or structuredness are equally 
important for determining direction-of-comparison effects and might yield similar 
consequences. Kardes and Kalyanaram (1992) showed a direction-of-comparison effect for 
pioneering brands. The first-entry advantage of the pioneering product over later entrants to 
the market results from the pioneer dominating the comparison stage. The dominance of 
information stemming from the standard is also demonstrated in a study by Medin, Goldstone, 
and Gentner (1993), in which participants had to indicate the features on which they based 
their comparison judgment. Independent raters assessed each feature with respect to whether 
it was more strongly associated with the target or the standard. Results showed that a majority 
of features considered for the judgment were linked to the standard. A general hypothesis that 
can be drawn from these considerations is that, whenever one option possesses a quality that 
clearly discriminates it from the other options in the set (‘comparative distinctiveness’; 
Higgins, 1996) it will be more easily accessible and hence more likely to serve as the standard 
of comparison. In such cases, the salient features of the distinct option become accentuated in 
the comparison process and have a stronger effect on the resulting judgment than features of 
the other options. The dominance of information stemming from the standard is a core tenet 
of both the structural alignment approach (Gentner & Markman, 1997) as well as in the 
referent model (Ortony, 1979). 
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To our knowledge, the reasoning of asymmetric comparison has not yet been applied 
to choices between multiple options. We assume that the processes that determine the 
asymmetry of comparisons and its effects on the judgment process for two-option judgments 
also apply to judgments involving larger sets of options. Accordingly, in a multiple-option 
setting that comprises a clearly distinct option, this option is likely to serve as a standard and 
the knowledge about this option is likely to dominate the comparison stage. Various 
conditions have the potential to render one option especially distinct from other options, such 
as certain environments that highlight certain options (e.g., by literally putting one option into 
the limelight) or the immediate choice context, namely the configuration of the choice set.  
Research on the attraction effect or the asymmetrical domination effect reveals how an 
added third option can change the shares of choices between two similar attractive options. In 
this research paradigm, binary choice sets – a target option and a competitor – are compared 
with trinary choice sets – a target, a competitor, and a decoy. The options are characterized on 
two attribute dimensions (e.g. quality and price) with the target being superior on one 
dimension and the competitor being superior on the other dimension. The location in the 
attribute space for the added third option is generally selected according to two conditions: 
First, the attractiveness of the additional option is lower than that of the other two options, so 
that it is hardly ever chosen. Second, the added option is fully dominated by the target (i.e., 
the target is superior on both dimensions) but only partly dominated by the competitor.  
In an early demonstration, Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) asked participants to make 
choices in six different product categories (e.g. cars, restaurants, beers, etc.). In a first session, 
the choice set consisted of the target and the competitor. In a second session 2 weeks later, a 
decoy was added. Interestingly, the target was chosen more often after the decoy was added. 
This effect has proven to be robust in many studies and under various conditions 
(Ratneshwar, Shocker, & Stewart, 1987; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). In a more recent study, 
Park and Kim (2005) showed that people anchor their judgment at the decoy even when the 
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decoy belongs to a different product domain than the target and the competitor. From the 
perspective we adopt in this paper, those effects reflect judgment evaluative processes that are 
anchored at the decoy (c.f., Herne, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), i.e. the additional 
option functions as a standard in such choice settings (Bhargava, Kim, & Srivastava, 2000).  
Although this hypothesis is a very general one that should, in principle, apply to all 
judgment and choice situations where one of the options is more salient than the others, we 
apply it to the sample case of one specific situation, namely the loss of an option from a set of 
options. We chose this situation to help us elaborate our hypothesis because it is a quite 
common phenomenon. People often postpone decisions, especially when choosing involves 
conflict or selection difficulties (C. J. Anderson, 2003; Dhar, 1997a; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). 
Postponement can result in one of the options becoming unavailable for various reasons (e.g., 
a special offer runs out). We propose that the exclusion of one option is a form of distinction 
thereby positioning it as a preferred standard. 
Asymmetric choices: The case of the lost option 
The restriction of choice has primarily been considered from a motivational 
perspective in view of the negative consequences a loss of freedom or autonomy might bring 
(e.g., Brehm, 1966; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Miron & Brehm, 2006). Although we acknowledge 
the importance of motivational aspects for understanding how people react to restrictions of 
their choice alternatives, in this paper we will primarily take a cognitive perspective and apply 
the research on asymmetric choices to the consequences of the loss of a previously available 
option. 
More specifically, we propose that the exclusion of one of the choice alternatives 
functions as a marker, which results in the excluded option being very likely to stand out 
against the remaining options, thus serving as the standard against which the remaining 
options are evaluated. We propose that this results in a contrast effect influencing the 
evaluation of the remaining options: Depending on the general valence of the choice situation 
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(i.e., Is this a choice between generally positively valued alternatives or one in which every 
alternative seems like a bad choice?), the exclusion will either lead to a decrease (in the first 
case) or an increase (in the latter case) in the value of the remaining options.  
As shown in Figure1, our model comprises three steps: (1) Standard selection: The 
excluded option is used as a standard for subsequent evaluations of the remaining options. (2) 
Asymmetric comparison: Due to the relative salience of the excluded option, the subsequent 
comparisons are asymmetric. (3) Featural focus: In these asymmetric comparisons, the 
excluded option determines which features of the options are considered. 
!
Figure 1. Process model for consequences of choice restriction. 
The exclusion of one of the options should make it stand out against the rest of the set 
because the exclusion is a distinctive feature. As argued by Gentner and Bowdle (1994) and 
Ortony (1979), the comparison process should then be biased towards the features of the 
excluded option. Hence, the features of the excluded option should determine which features 
are considered in the comparison process and provide a reference point.  
The exclusion, however, does not determine which features of the excluded option are 
particularly salient and used for the evaluation of the remaining ones. We posit that the 
salience of the features in a given choice situation depends on how generally attractive (e.g., 
choice between equally tasty entrees) or unattractive (e.g., choice between equally unpleasant 
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household chores) the options in the choice set are. A choice between attractive alternatives 
should be associated with a positive outcome expectation (e.g., regardless of which of the 
entrees I choose, I will enjoy the meal) and a choice between unattractive alternatives with a 
negative outcome expectation (e.g., I will hate doing the chore, regardless of whether it is 
vacuuming or doing the dishes). In turn, the general expectation should guide one’s attention 
to positive or negative features of the choice options, respectively (Trope & Liberman, 1996). 
So, the positive features of the excluded option should be more salient when one has positive 
outcome expectations. In contrast, the negative features of the excluded option should be 
more salient when one has negative outcome expectations. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the impact of outcome expectation (middle row) and exclusion of an option (bottom 
row) on the representation of options (top row). Small Greek letters symbolize features of options (+ positive, - 
negative). Left column shows consequences for positive outcome expectations, right column for negative 
outcome expectations. 
!
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This has important consequences for the subsequent comparison process. When the 
positive features of the excluded option are more salient, the evaluation of the remaining 
options should be dominated by the advantages of the excluded option. In consequence, the 
remaining options should decrease in attractiveness. The left panel of Figure2 illustrates this 
process: Three choice alternatives are characterized by a number of positive (small Greek 
letter with a plus sign) or negative features (small Greek letter with a minus sign). When the 
general outcome expectation for the decision is positive (i.e., choice between attractive  
alternatives), people should represent the options primarily in terms of their positive 
features (second row in Fig. 2). The exclusion of option A should lead to a representation of 
the remaining options primarily in comparison to option A (third row in Fig. 2). This process 
has two consequences: First, the remaining options should appear less attractive after the 
exclusion than they did before because their representation is now comprised of fewer 
positive features. Second, due to the modified representation, option B should be chosen 
because, in light of the excluded option A, it has more positive features than option C does. 
The opposite should occur when an option from a set of negative options is excluded 
(see right panel of Fig. 2): The exclusion of an option from a set of options primarily 
represented by negative features should result in the remaining options appearing more 
attractive because the excluded option held unique negative features that are not matched by 
the remaining options. Thus, a more positive representation of the remaining options should 
result. In this case, option C should profit more from the exclusion of option A and be chosen.  
Consider the choice between three beverages. The choice set might include a soft 
drink known for being tasty (A), a fruit juice that is healthy (B), or a mineral water that is 
especially refreshing (C). If the fruit juice is excluded from the choice set, the remaining 
options should be considered with respect to the extent that they are healthy beverages. 
Assuming that the mineral water scores higher on this dimension, our model would predict a 
preference for this option as a consequence of the restriction (C > A). In case of the exclusion 
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of the soft drink (A), the tastiness dimension should be accentuated, yielding a preference for 
the fruit juice given that it is considered tastier than the mineral water (B > C). If the mineral 
water (C) is excluded, then how refreshing a drink is should dominate the comparison, 
making the soft drink more attractive than the fruit juice (A > B). Our model, then, predicts a 
violation of transitivity as the rank ordering for the remaining options is predicted to vary due 
to the exclusion of one of the choice options (cf., Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Mellers, 2006; P. 
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983) . 
Under specific conditions, our model also predicts preference reversals. As an 
example, consider the following choice among four CD players (A, B, C, D) that differ on the 
two attribute dimensions price and quality. Whereas A and B are superior in quality, C and D 
are less expensive. According to the proposed model, an exclusion of option A should 
increase the likelihood of choosing option B, whereas an exclusion of option D should 
increase the likelihood of choosing option C. Such predictions are in line with empirical 
results found in research on out-of-stock options (‘phantom decoys’; e.g.,  Doyle, O’Connor, 
Reynolds, & Bottomley, 1999; Highhouse, 1996; Pettibone & Wedell, 2007). To summarize, 
the proposed model not only predicts an influence on the evaluation of the remaining options, 
but also on the subsequent choice between the remaining options. Building on the reasoning 
of the referent model (Ortony, 1979) and the structural alignment model (Gentner & 
Markman, 1994), the proposed model claims that the salient features in the excluded option 
accentuate properties of the remaining options.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to apply asymmetric comparison models that were 
developed in similarity research to the domain of choice. Our central theoretical claim was 
that whenever choice sets are characterized by a homogenous subset and a single 
discriminatively prominent option, asymmetric comparisons should result. In these 
comparisons, the salient features of the prominent option set the featural focus for the 
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comparison process and hence the evaluative process. For instance, when one of the options 
in the set of alternatives is excluded during the decision process, it should serve as the 
standard against which the remaining options are evaluated. Interestingly, this could lead to a 
reversal in the valence of the remaining options. The predictions derived from this model still 
await empirical testing.  
Coming back to our initial example of purchasing a CD player, our analysis would 
suggest that, if of the models is no longer available, its features would likely dominate your 
evaluation of alternative models. So, even if an alternative model outperformed the 
unavailable one with respect to other features or performed almost as well on the highlighted 
featureat a lower price, you might still end up waiting for the return of the unavailable model 
in order to purchase it – even though it may not be the one that best fits your needs. 
. 
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 Abstract 
Various lines of research in decision-making show that irrelevant past events exert a 
pervasive influence on current decisions. The mechanisms of this influence remain often 
unclear. In this paper we make the case that, in choices, the exclusion of one out of a set of 
options enhances the cognitive accessibility of the excluded option. Two experiments 
employing an incidental memory paradigm demonstrate, that people recall more attributes of 
an excluded option than attributes of options they can still choose. We argue that basic 
cognitive principles account for this effect and discuss its impact on subsequent decisions.  
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Introduction 
Entirely rational beings would stop thinking about options that are not available to 
them. It is often argued that a strictly rational decision maker only considers the future 
consequences of her decisions and ignores past events such as missed opportunities, as long 
as they are irrelevant for the consequences of the present decision.  In sharp contrast to this 
normative view, however, the past often exerts a pervasive influence on decision-making. 
This might be adaptive as people can profit from past experiences to forecast consequences 
of a present decision. The personal past serves to enhance the accuracy of estimates of the 
affective consequences and the probabilities of these consequences. For example, in order to 
decide what to eat in a restaurant, we will use our past general experiences with the food 
offered on the menu to determine what to order.  If available, we will base our decision on 
experience with the specific dish in this specific restaurant to enhance the accuracy of our 
prediction even more. However, influences of past experiences might not always be adaptive. 
Information we gathered in the past might be outdated and not longer accurate. For example, 
circumstances might have changes as is the case when the set of options has changed.  
In this paper we will take a closer look at how the past intrudes on decisions in the 
case of lost options. We propose a cognitive account of how excluded options effect 
subsequent decision-making (Ritter & Freund, in press). More specifically, in the current set 
of studies we investigate the hypothesis that the exclusion of an option enhances its cognitive 
accessibility. Several lines of research imply that a past event, which, taking a rational 
perspective, should be irrelevant for the decision amongst the remaining options, exerts a 
pervasive influence on judgments and decisions. An underlying but as of yet untested 
assumption is that the past event remains cognitively activated. We will present two 
experiments testing the cognitive perseverance of lost options and discuss its impact on 
subsequent decisions. 
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Maladaptive Influence of the Past 
Despite the adaptiveness of considering past experiences for present decisions, 
research in judgment and decision-making has also shown that influence of the past can yield 
sub-optimal decisions. A famous example is known as the gamblers’ fallacy (cf., Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1972), in which people are generally susceptible to believe that after a line of red 
numbers at a roulette table, next there just has to come a black number. The probability, 
however, always stays at below 50 percent. Another example is the hindsight bias (e.g., 
Fischhoff, 1975). Imagine the question how likely it was three months before the elections 
that Barack Obama would become the next president of the United States. Most people will 
find it very hard to ignore their knowledge about the factual result and hence overestimate the 
likelihood when compared to forecasts of the election results.  
Many real-life decisions are not one-shot games in which we make a decision, 
experience its outcome, and move on to the next unrelated decision, but entail longer 
commitment and repetitive decisions or (re-) affirmations. For instance, the achievement of 
long-term goals such as career or family-related goals requires tenacity and perseverance. 
That is, for many decisions there are subsequent follow-up decisions whether we want to 
either stick to a former decision, continue with a current course of action, and invest more in 
an ongoing project, or reallocate our resources. Such deliberations may become especially 
critical in the event of obstacles and setbacks, or when resources are diminishing. A 
paradigmatic case is sunk cost effect that shows that future investment of resources depends 
on past resource investments even though past investments are irrelevant to the likelihood of 
success (e.g., Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Linder, 1986).  
In these examples, the pervasive influence of the past on human judgment and 
decision-making collides with normative conceptions of the rational perspective. Despite the 
general functionality of the granted impact of past experiences and actions on present 
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judgments and decisions, there are evident occasions, where the ability to block such an 
impact would be desirable. Especially when people experience the presence of past 
opportunities as aversive. If people missed out on opportunities they once had, they might 
feel regret for not having made up their mind in time. 
The Case of a Lost Option 
Oftentimes, people find it difficult to make a decision and are prone to defer their 
decision (C. J. Anderson, 2003; Dhar, 1997b). By deferring decisions, options of the initial 
choice set might no longer be available. A normative, rational perspective might claim that a 
lost option should have no impact on the current choice and on the choice satisfaction 
because the excluded option is no longer relevant. This position might not hold descriptively, 
however, as, similar to the previous examples, the impact of past experience is pervasive for 
current judgments and decisions. 
In the case of an excluded option, early studies on reactance theory (Brehm, 1966, 
1989) demonstrated that people’s choice exhibits systematic influences after the exclusion of 
an option. In a classical study (Brehm, 1966) participants’ positive evaluation of an option 
increased significantly after it was excluded from the choice set. The theoretical perspective 
of reactance theory interprets the increase in attractiveness of an excluded option from a 
choice set in motivational terms. It assumes a primordial motive to be free in one’s choices. 
The restriction of the choice set threatens this freedom and induces an aversive emotional 
state (reactance). This emotional state motivates people to act in a way to reestablish their 
freedom. The increased subjective attractiveness of the excluded option is assumed to 
indicate the protest of people against the restriction to their freedom to choose. Reactance 
theory has stipulated numerous studies that show, that the loss of an option affects the 
evaluation of the excluded option (Miron & Brehm, 2006). Moreover, the restriction also 
affects the evaluation of the remaining options and the preference in the end. If there is no 
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possibility to restore the initial choice set and make the lost option available again, people 
tend to symbolically restore their freedom by choosing an option that is most similar to the 
lost option. In terms of reactance theory, the choice of an option that is most similar to the 
excluded option constitutes a form of symbolically restoring one’s freedom.  
Recently we proposed a model that focuses on the cognitive consequences of the 
exclusion of an option from a choice set (Ritter & Freund, 2009a).The focus on the cognitive 
processes leaves room for differential consequences as compared to the motivational 
perspective in reactance theory. Reactance theory allows only one direction of predictions: 
motive-congruent events (here: no restriction of choice) lead to positive consequences (here: 
positive affect, positive evaluation of available options) and motive-incongruent events (here: 
experience of restriction) lead to negative consequences (here: negative affect, striving for the 
unavailable option). We adopt an affective neutral cognitive perspective in order to examine 
the processes by which the exclusion affects the decision. The tenet of the cognitive 
perspective claims that the consequences of a restriction crucially depend on information 
processes that are stipulated by the event. That is, consequences depend on which 
information is processed and how this information is processed following the restriction. 
Although we acknowledge the relevance of motivational states in the context of choice 
restriction, the informational perspective offers a more flexible tool of analysis. 
As a starting point in this model, we claim that the exclusion leads to a higher 
accessibility of the excluded option as compared to the remaining options. From a rational 
perspective, one could argue that the representation of a lost option should be discarded, as it 
is irrelevant for the decision. An adaptive mechanism would therefore inhibit the accessibility 
of the lost option’s representation in order to impede potential impact on the decision process. 
In contrast, we argue that the exclusion of an option actually fosters its accessibility. We 
argue that the exclusion yields a figure-ground asymmetry with the excluded option as the 
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figure standing out from the ground of the remaining options. In such a constellation, the 
figure is more salient than the background and higher in accessibility. 
First, accessibility is a function of the prominence or comparative distinctiveness of 
an object among other objects or a feature of an object among other features (Higgins, 1996, 
2000). The more an object is distinct from other objects in a set, the more it stands out as 
figural to the background of the other objects (Koffka, 1935). The exclusion of an option 
adds an informational tag to the excluded option rendering the excluded option distinct from 
the remaining options. The distinctness from the other options enhances its accessibility. This 
rationale applies especially for situations, in which the loss of the option occurs as a result of 
choice deferral due to the absence of a clear preference: under such conditions, it can be 
assumed that the options in the choice set form a homogenous compound on the overall 
attractiveness level despite potential differences on the feature level. The exclusion enhances 
the distinctiveness of the excluded option and should therefore foster its prominence and 
accessibility.  
Second, whereas the remaining options stay unchanged, the representation of the 
excluded option is changed by the exclusion as the information about the unavailability is 
added. The alteration of the excluded option brings about differences in the novelty of the 
representations of the excluded option as compared to the remaining options. Differences on 
the novelty dimension are equally associated with differences in salience of objects (Wang, 
Cavanagh, & Green, 1994). Whereas novel objects pop out from an array of objects, familiar 
objects sink in (Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliott, & DeWitt, 1990; Johnston & Schwarting, 
1997). That is, the representation of the excluded option stands out from the set of the 
representations of the remaining options due to its alteration or relative novelty. 
A third principle, associated with salience effects is valence (Shen & Reingold, 2001). 
In the context of choice, unavailability as opposed to availability represents negative 
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information. Differences in valence are also associated with differences in salience. Negative 
information shows a similar pop out effect like new information (Peeters, 1983; Pratto & 
John, 1991; Wentura & Rothermund, 2003). Accordingly, the negativity of the unavailability 
is likely to increase the salience of the lost option, making it more accessible. 
The three principles of comparative distinctness, familiarity, and valence work in 
favor of the figurality of the representation of the lost option. In consequence, accessibility of 
the representation of the lost option should be higher as compared to the remaining options. 
On this basis, we propose the following hypotheses: The exclusion of an option from a choice 
set leads to higher accessibility of this option.  
It is important to note, that the described salience processes are likely to occur only 
before people made their decision and under conditions of weak initial preferences towards 
the options. After a, even preliminary, decision is made, the choice is generally bolstered by 
affirmative information processing ("spreading of alternatives"; Mann & Taylor, 1970; 
Tyszka, 1998). In the same vein, pronounced preferences distort the information processing 
for the benefits of the favored option (Kunda, 1990; Mills, 1999; Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 
1996), and would therefore superimpose the hypothesized process. 
Overview over the experiments 
Two experiments used an incidental memory task to assess the accessibility of options 
after the exclusion of one of the options from a choice set. In Experiment 1, participants were 
asked to imagine a choice between cars. In Experiment 2, participants faced an actual choice 
between cups. For both choice sets, we generated a list of five attributes to describe each 
option.  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants (N=110; 68% female; Mage = 28 years; 76% students) were 
recruited via the participants pool of our lab and via flyers in the university.  
Materials. In order to find attributes for the three cars, we conducted a web research 
on car advertisements, extracting a pool of forty German adjectives used to describe cars. Out 
of these forty adjectives, we formed three groups of five adjectives each. Groups were 
matched with regard to word length and frequency.1 The adjective lists were added to 
downsized black and white picture of a small car, entitled with an imaginary car name 
(“Keto”, “Daro”,”Nilo”). Pictures of the cars were blurred as to not give any apparent visual 
information about the actual car. All three cars were presented simultaneously. Three sets of 
presentation were used to control for order of presentation. As these three set did not differ 
from each other, they were combined into one analysis. 
Procedure. Participation was reimbursed with 10 Swiss francs (ca. $10 at that time).  
The experiment was conducted in group sessions in computer-equipped cubicles with a 
maximum of four participants at a time. The total duration of the experiment was about 
twenty minutes. 
Upon arriving in the laboratory, participants signed an informed consent form. Then 
the computer-run experiment started. As experimental software, we used MediaLab (Jarvis, 
2006).  
On the introductory slide, participants were informed that the study investigated 
effects of product descriptions on preference. They would therefore be presented with a 
choice of three options, each described by a list of attributes. Participants were told to focus 
on the descriptions and read them thoroughly, but not yet make their decision, as they would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 We used the frequency service tool of the vocabulary web site of the University of Leipzig, Germany, to assess 
frequency of words (http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de). 
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receive more information in the course of the experiment. These instructions were followed 
by the presentation of one slide presenting the three cars with pictures and descriptive 
adjectives for each of them. This slide stayed on the screen for ninety seconds. Afterwards, 
the slide changed and participants were informed that in their case, one of the options had to 
be excluded from the choice set. The exact wording of this message read: “Please note: The 
car DARO was excluded from the selection. In the following you will only be able to choose 
between NILO and KETO.” Controlling for possible effects of excluding one of the specific 
cars, there were three conditions that excluded one of the cars. Again, no differences between 
these three conditions were found, so we will report the combined analyses.  
The message of the exclusion of one of the options was displayed for fifteen seconds, 
followed by a filler task of ninety seconds (a random selection of difficult trials of a 
vocabulary test, Spot-a-word, Lehrl, 1977). After this interval, participants were asked to 
recall any of the adjectives of the initial presentation of the options in no particular order. 
This incidental memory task was followed by a slide on which participants made their choice 
between the remaining cars. Then, participants were asked to answer a number of questions 
on participants’ attitudes towards cars and the decision process if they were actually planning 
to purchase a car. These questions were administered to control for interindividual 
differences in involvement with the specific choice set. Apart from these car related 
questions, participants filled out several questionnaires not pertaining to the present paper. As 
a measure of memory closely related to the implicit memory task, we administered an explicit 
general memory task, in which participants were required to memorize twenty words that 
appeared sequentially on the screen and recall them after a short time interval filled with a 
calculation task.   
After the experiment, participants were thanked, paid, and debriefed. For a subgroup 
of the participants a funneled debriefing was realized with first asking the participants for any 
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suspicions about the purpose of the experiment in general, and afterwards asking what they 
thought about the exclusion of one option. None of the participants articulated any suspicion 
concerning the exclusion. 
Results 
We calculated for each participant an index for the relative memory advantage for 
attributes of the excluded option over attributes of the remaining options by subtracting the 
mean of recalled attributes of the two remaining options from the number of recalled 
attributes of the excluded option. Positive values on this index represent a memory advantage 
for the excluded option, negative values mean that that more attributes of the remaining 
options were recalled. Five participants failed to recall any adjective, and indicated that they 
did not read the descriptions thoroughly. They were therefore excluded from further analysis.  
As expected, we found a recall advantage for the attributes of the excluded option 
over the attributes of the remaining options (M=0.15, CI=0.02-0.28, d= 0.22).2 On the level 
of single attributes, the mean difference of recall probability for excluded versus remaining 
options was positive (M = 4.29%; CI = 2.07 % - 6.58 %; d = 0.47).  Two thirds of the 
attributes (10 of 15) were more likely to be recalled when the option they described was 
excluded as to when the option remained. None of the control variables - personal 
involvement with cars and attitudes towards buying a car, car ownership, or any of the other 
questions - were related to the dependent variable (rs = -.13 – .00, all CIs included 0).  
Taken together, Study 1 showed a memory advantage for attributes of the excluded 
option over the attributes of the remaining options on the level of means, individuals, as well 
as attributes. When thinking about the initial set of alternatives, participants recalled more 
attributes from the excluded option. Interest in cars and personal involvement with the choice 
was unrelated to this memory advantage.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 We report 20%-trimmed means (Wilcox, 2001) and the corresponding 90% confidence intervals (percentile 
bootstraping method; Wilcox & Keselman, 2003). A 90% CI was selected because of the directed hypothesis. 
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Experiment 2 
The aim of the second experiment was to replicate Experiment 1 with several 
refinements: First, Experiment 1 presented a hypothetical choice. In Experiment 2, 
participants had to make an actual choice between three cups that they received at the end of 
the experiment as part of the compensation. Second, in Experiment 1, the equal attractiveness 
of the options was established through pilot testing using the mean attractiveness rating as a 
criterion. Although we designed the options to have equal overall attractiveness at a group 
level, we could not control individual spontaneous preferences. For that reason, we included 
individual ratings of the options in the second study. Third, although Experiment 1 showed a 
recall advantage for attributes of the excluded option, this effect could still be triggered 
through an affective-motivational process, as proposed by reactance theory. People might 
keep the excluded option in mind as it stands for threat to their freedom. To rule out this 
alternative explanation, we included affective measures before and after the exclusion.  
Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 116; 70% female; Mage = 25 yrs) were students of the 
University of Zurich, who were recruited on campus and volunteered to participate in 
exchange for 5 Swiss francs (equal of 5 US$ at that time) and a mug that they could choose in 
the course of the experiment.  
Materials. A web search on mug advertisements served as the source for adjectives. 
From the derived pool of forty adjectives, we compiled three groups of five adjectives each 
for the description of the three different options. Groups of attributes were matched with 
regard to word length and frequency. We complemented each description with a blurry black 
and white picture of a mug and a name for the mug (“Oslo”, “Sofia”, “Riga”).  
Procedure. Participants were told, that in the course of the experiment, they would 
have a choice between three mugs and that at the end of the experiment, they would receive 
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their choice as a gift. They were also instructed to base their choices on descriptions of the 
options, as the pictures were only schematic. After these instructions, participants filled out a 
short version of the Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire (Steyer, Schwenkmezger, 
Notz, & Eid, 1997) and then evaluated each option separately. For these evaluations, each 
option was presented in the middle of the screen and participants could use a slider displayed 
on the right to indicate their evaluation on a range anchored between 0 and 100. A conjoint 
presentation of the three options followed the individual ratings and stayed on the screen for 
thirty seconds. Orders of the individual rating and placement order on the conjoint 
presentation was varied in three different ways across participants. The order of adjectives in 
each description was randomly determined for each participant. After the conjoint 
presentation, a message appeared on the screen, indicating that the attractiveness ratings were 
transmitted into the study database. This transmission stopped after twenty seconds, and a 
new message appeared on the screen, informing the participant about the exclusion of one of 
the options. The message read as follows: “The cup RIGA had to be excluded from the 
choice. This means that you will be able to choose between the cup OSLO and the cup 
SOFIA.” Again, the option excluded varied across participants. The message remained on the 
screen for 16 seconds, followed by the incidental memory task, in which participants were 
asked to recall the attributes of the initial presentation in any order. They then filled out a 
parallel version of the MMSQ. After a series of additional questionnaires that are not relevant 
in the present context, participants were asked to indicate which mug they would choose and 
did the same free recall task as in Study 1. After completion of the experiment, participants 
were thanked, debriefed, paid and received the mug. 
Results  
One participant recalled all the attributes of the options by using a mnemotechnique 
and was excluded from the analysis. For the rest of the participants, we calculated the same 
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index for recall advantage as in Study 1 by subtracting the mean of recall attributes for the 
remaining options from the number of recalled attributes of the excluded option. Neither this 
index, nor the number of recalled attributes of each option or the total of recalled attributes 
was affected by the order of presentation, so this factor was dropped from further analysis.  
As argued above, the effect of the exclusion of an option could be distorted by 
pronounced differences in the evaluations of the options. Therefore, we calculated the SD of 
the individual attractiveness ratings of the options as a measure for a pronounced preference 
and excluded all participants that scored higher than the 1 SD above the mean. This resulted 
in an effective sample of N = 99.  
The main prediction – a memory advantage for the excluded option - was again 
supported. Across participants, the memory index was again positive (M = 0.18;  CI = .03 – 
.34, d = 0.14), indicating that participants were recalled more attributes of the excluded than 
of the remaining options. This held true also on the single attribute level with a mean 
difference in recall probability of 4.06 % (CI = 1.96 % – 7.66%; d =  0.66). Ten of the fifteen 
attributes were more likely to be recalled when the option was excluded as compared to when 
it remained.  
In an additional analysis, we tested the possible effect of mood on this memory effect. 
The affective state of participants showed a slight decrease from before to after the exclusion 
(M = -0.13; CI = -0.19 – -0.07; d = 0.22). This decrease, however, proved unrelated to recall 
advantage effect (r = -.03; CI = -.21 – +.15), excluding the possibility of affect as a mediator 
for the effect.  
Thus, Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 for an actual choice.  
Participants recalled more attributes of the option they could no longer choose than attributes 
of options still available to them, knowing that the would actually receive what they choose.  
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General Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that the exclusion of an option makes it 
more rather than less cognitively accessible. In two studies employing an incidental memory 
paradigm, we found that people are more likely to recall attributes of an option that is no 
longer available to them than attributes of options they can still choose. Free recall is not a 
pure measure of cognitive accessibility, but rather a compound of several processes (e.g., J. 
R. Anderson & Bower, 1972). Nevertheless, the incidental memory task combined with free 
recall seems particularly well suited in the current context because it mirrors the real life 
situations when, after an option is lost, a person reconsiders her options. If anything, one 
could argue that we worked against our hypothesis by using this paradigm because other 
processes than the exclusion of an option might have influenced which of the attributes of the 
presented options were recalled. One such process is the tendency to form spontaneous 
preferences when confronted with a choice (Zajonc, 1980). Preferences and preliminary 
decisions bias the information processing (e.g., Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 1998; Russo, 
Meloy, & Wilks, 2000). Attributes of a preferred option are more likely to be recalled 
(Beckmann & Gollwitzer, 1987). To counteract the development of spontaneous preferences, 
we designed a choice situation in which people are undecided. We therefore chose attributes 
that were unlikely to tap into strong pre-experimental attitudes. Moreover, in Study 1 we 
pretested the options to establish a comparable attractiveness of all three options. Study 2 
assessed personal evaluations of the options and excluded participants with strong initial 
preferences for the same purpose.  Let us also add that the exclusion itself could not have 
influenced the development of an initial preferences because the exclusion occurred only 
after the options were presented. The current studies cannot address the question if people 
might try to suppress the excluded option, thereby making it – ironically – more accessible 
(Wegner, 1994).  
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The cognitive perspective adopted in this paper adds to several bottom-up 
perspectives on regret, inaction inertia, and counterfactual thinking (e.g., Byrne, 1997). 
Other, more top-down oriented perspectives focus on the functionality of pervasive memory 
influences on decisions, regarding them either as biases, dysfunctional side effects or 
functional processes (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Olson, 1995). In the case of an 
excluded option, it seems more functional to mentally discard the excluded option, 
preventing potential regret about the missed opportunity. This would be in line with 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) which would predict the downgrading of an option that is 
no longer available. This, however, should only be the case for if the excluded option was the 
preferred one. Moreover, Festinger (1957, 1964) claimed that dissonance resolution would 
only take place after a decision was made. Within the dissonance theory framework, 
however, the predecisional impact of processes preventing dissonance is conversely 
discussed (Brownstein, 2003). If a dissonance resolution process took place in the current 
studies, it was dominated by the proposed salience effect. 
What are the implications of the cognitive accessibility of a lost option? In a recent 
model (Ritter & Freund, in press), we argue that a figure-ground asymmetry between the 
remaining and the excluded option yields asymmetric comparisons with the excluded option 
as a standard cognitive reference point (Rosch, 1975). More specifically, we claim that the 
excluded option is cognitively more accessible and hence serves as the standard of 
comparison for the remaining options. The role of the standard in these comparisons is 
twofold: Its salient features accentuate dimensions of comparisons (Bowdle & Gentner, 
1997) and it provides a point of reference for relative judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Based on these assumptions our model makes divergent predictions concerning the 
evaluative consequences of an exclusion. For salient positive features within the 
representation of the excluded option, the remaining options should decrease in 
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attractiveness. This should be the case, when, for example, the positive features posses more 
discriminative value than the negative features or, when people have positive outcome 
expectations, i.e., the general valence of the choice set is positive (Dhar  & Sherman, 1999; 
Houston & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1998; Houston et al., 1991). For salient negative features, on 
the other hand, attractiveness of the remaining options should increase due to the exclusion. 
This should occur, when the negative features are more discriminative than the positive 
features or the general valence of the choice set is negative. Providing evidence for higher 
cognitive accessibility, then, represents the starting point of this model. 
On a practical level, the loss of an option might lead to a subsequent failure to choose 
other good alternatives (when the remaining option are devaluated, (cf., Arkes, Kung, & 
Hutzel, 2002; M. Zeelenberg, Nijstad, van Putten, & Van Dijk, 2006) or choice of suboptimal 
option (in case of increase attractiveness due to the exclusion). Both cases bear the danger of 
provoking maladaptive decision processes that are not easily prevented.  
To conclude: The link between past experience and present decisions goes beyond the 
use of the experience as an empirical basis to enhance the accuracy of predictions concerning 
future experiences. In some cases, the past has a pervasive influence despite its irrelevancy 
for future outcomes. In this paper, we argued that in the case of a lost option, cognitive 
processes enhance the accessibility of the excluded option, thereby granting it impact on the 
subsequent judgments and decisions. 
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Part III: 
Consequences of a Restriction of Choice: Shifting Evaluations and Choices  
Ritter, J. O. & Freund, A. M. 
Manuscript submitted for publication: Social Cognition
 Abstract 
The present research examines the consequences of a restriction of choice. Based on a recent 
model on the cognitive consequences of an exclusion of one option from a choice set (Ritter 
& Freund, 2009a), two experiments tested the hypothesis that choice restriction leads to a 
systematic change in the evaluations of and preference for the remaining options. The model 
predicts that the shift in the evaluation of the remaining options depends on the valence of the 
salient features of the excluded option. Supporting this hypothesis, Experiment 1 shows that 
the exclusion of an option leads to divergent evaluative consequences depending on the 
valence of the salient features in the choice set. Experiment 2 extends this finding by 
demonstrating how the exclusion leads to a shift of preference among the remaining options.  
 
Keywords: restriction of choice, lost options, preference 
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Introduction 
Imagine you are sitting in a restaurant and thinking about what to eat. There are three 
different dishes on the menu that sound very appealing to you and you cannot make up your 
mind. You then learn from the waiter that one of the dishes is not available today. How will 
you react when you cannot have what you might have wanted? Will you feel relieved that 
now you have to decide only between two choices and like the remaining ones even more? Or 
will you be convinced that the dish that is not available today would have been the best choice 
now that you cannot have it? In this paper, we take a cognitive perspective on the 
consequences of the restriction of choice for evaluations and preferences. More precisely, we 
argue that the exclusion of an option leads to a systematic shift of the evaluations of and the 
choice between the remaining options.  
Considerable work has been dedicated at studying the addition alternatives to a choice 
set (Heath & Chatterjee, 1995; Huber et al., 1982; Huber & Puto, 1983; Park & Kim, 2005; 
Ratneshwar et al., 1987; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). The central finding of this research is 
that the addition of an alternative can amend the preference between the initial options while 
the added alternative itself is irrelevant for the decision, i.e., functions as a decoy. The present 
research somewhat parallels this research by asking the opposite question: What are the 
consequences of the exclusion of an option from a choice set? 
Restriction of Choice 
People show a general tendency to try to keep doors open in decisions (Carmon, 
Wertenbroich, & Zeelenberg, 2003; Shin & Dan, 2004), that is, they put effort into sustaining 
the availability of options and prevent the loss of options. This tendency is also reflected in 
the fact that people prefer decisions that can be revised over final ones, even though 
reversibility diminishes the satisfaction with the outcome of a choice (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). 
This effect is at least partly triggered by loss aversion as one loses all options that were not 
chosen when committing to one of them. Moreover, simply having an option available seems 
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to evince some feelings of endowment for the options under consideration (Carmon et al., 
2003; Shin & Dan, 2004). Reactance theory points in a similar direction (Brehm, 1966). 
Based on the assumption that people have a motive to choose freely, a restriction – a threat to 
this motive – constitutes an aversive experience and motivates people to restore their 
freedom. In consequence, according to reactance theory, the restriction of choice enhances the 
subjective value of the excluded option, and people strive to either be able to reestablish the 
availability of the excluded option or choose an option similar to the excluded option (Brehm, 
Stires, Sensenig, & Shaban, 1966; Min, 2004). 
Other research, however, has pointed to more variable consequences of restricted 
choices. In consumer research, Fitzsimons (2000) has shown that the decision satisfaction 
decreases when one of the options is no longer available (i.e., stock-outs), especially, when 
the stock-out option was attractive and was considered for purchase. If rather unattractive 
options are unavailable, however, decision satisfaction can even increase when the choice set 
is large. Research on unavailable options in otherwise balanced choices between two options 
(“phantom decoys”) has also revealed the potential of such unavailable options to affect 
choices (e.g., Highhouse, 1996; Pratkanis & Farquhar, 1992).  
Accentuation Model of Option Exclusion 
Recently, we proposed a model on the cognitive consequences of a restriction of 
choice (Ritter & Freund, 2009a, see Figure 3). The Accentuation Model is concerned with 
how the exclusion of an option affects the evaluation of the remaining options. The 
Accentuation Model makes two assumptions: First, the exclusion of an option yields an 
accessibility asymmetry between the excluded and the remaining options with the excluded 
option standing out. Second, the accessibility asymmetry changes the evaluation of the 
remaining options such that the remaining options are evaluated against the excluded option. 
In other words, the excluded option serves as a standard in asymmetric comparisons that 
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underlie the evaluation process. The salient features within the excluded option set the 
featural focus in these comparisons.  
!
Figure 3. Process Model of the Consequences of a Restriction of Choice (Accentuation Model, after Ritter & 
Freund, 2009a) 
Initial evidence for the first assumption was found in two studies using an incidental 
memory paradigm (Ritter & Freund, 2009b). For two different choice sets (a choice between 
cars and cups, respectively), features of the excluded option were recalled with a higher 
probability than features of the remaining options. The present set of experiments tests the 
second assumption. 
Rationale for the Accentuation Model 
From a normative-rational perspective, the excluded option should be irrelevant for 
the further choice process as it can no longer be chosen; the decision process should therefore 
be independent of the excluded option. As research on context effects in choices shows, 
however, irrelevant options often amend the decision process (e.g., Heath & Chatterjee, 1995; 
Huber et al., 1982). Evaluations and judgments are relative by nature as every evaluation 
includes some kind of comparison (Mussweiler, 2003). The evaluation depends on the 
information processed during the comparison. Which information is used, is greatly 
determined by the standard or reference point. There are several principles that can guide the 
cognitive system in the standard selection (cf., Mussweiler, 2003a). For instance, more 
accessible objects are more likely to serve as a standard than less accessible objects (e.g., 
Herr, 1986). Accessibility of an object can be influenced through priming. As research on the 
anchoring paradigm has revealed, arbitrary, or even explicitly irrelevant contextual 
information can turn into a reference point if presented before the judgment (Critcher & 
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Gilovich, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Cognitive accessibility is also a function of 
salience (Higgins, 1996, 2000). The salient object among other objects is more likely to be 
selected as a standard (Tversky, 1977).  
Studies on the anchoring effect have shown that judgments are highly susceptible to 
context information that can be used as a reference point (e.g., Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; 
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The impact of this context 
information is executed by making standard-related knowledge about the judgment target 
more accessible (G. B. Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler, 2001b; Mussweiler & Strack, 
1999a, 1999b). The role of the standard of comparison is also highlighted in the research on 
asymmetric comparison (e.g., Gentner & Bowdle, 1994; Ortony, 1979; Tversky, 1977). 
Verbal instructions (e.g., “How similar is A to B?”) but also object attributes like prominence 
or structuredness can assign one of the comparison objects the role of the target (position A) 
or the standard (position B). Switching target and standard typically yields different 
judgments. The standard seems to serve as the knowledge base that guides which of the 
dimensions or features of the comparison objects are taken into account for the similarity 
judgment (Markman & Medin, 1995; Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993; Ritter & Freund, 
2009a). 
Building on this literature, we assume that a standard of comparison fulfills a two-fold 
role: First, the standard enhances the accessibility of the features that are salient within the 
standard. The salient features of the standard will then be compared to the target. This 
prediction is based on the assumption that the accessibility of features determines if it is used 
in the comparison process. Second, standard information is used as a reference point for a 
relative judgment. This function is inherent to the concept of a standard of comparison as 
comparisons are necessarily relative to a standard. Even fairly basic judgments such as the 
severity of pain are subjected to this principle (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & 
Redelmeier, 1993).  
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In choices between multiple options, the compound of the choice options functions as an 
evaluative background for the evaluation of each option. It is an almost trivial observation 
that the same option can appear very attractive among rather mediocre alternatives but rather 
mediocre among very attractive alternatives. But even when people have a predefined ideal 
standard when entering a choice process, the context of the options amends this level (Simon, 
1955). Moreover, for reasons of limited processing capacities, not all information about all 
options will be used as a standard for evaluating each option. People might construe an ideal 
standard by assembling the most salient positive features of the options or an anti-ideal 
standard by assembling the most salient negative features of the different options. If one of 
the options is more prominent, however, we argue that the salient option will take the role of 
the standard to which the other options will be compared (Ritter & Freund, 2009a). 
Predictions 
Based on the assumptions of the Accentuation Model, we predict that the exclusion of 
an option leads to a shift in the perceived attractiveness of the remaining options. The shift in 
attractiveness should depend on the valence of the salient features of the excluded option. If 
positive features in the excluded option are salient, the exclusion should accentuate the 
advantages of the excluded option, thereby decreasing the attractiveness of the remaining 
options. In contrast, if negative features are more salient within the excluded option, the 
exclusion accentuates the disadvantages of the excluded option, thereby enhancing the 
attractiveness of the remaining options. If negative features are highly salient in the excluded 
option, the option most dissimilar to the excluded option should be preferred. Conversely, if 
positive features are highly salient in the excluded option, the option that comes closest to the 
excluded option should be preferred. Our model therefore also predicts a preference shift as a 
consequence of the exclusion.  
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Overview of the Experiments 
 We tested the predictions concerning the shift in evaluation and the impact of the 
decision in two experiments. Both experiments made use of the fact that in choices, more 
attentions is paid to unique than to shared features (Houston & Sherman, 1995). Whereas 
shared features provide no discriminative value, unique features allow differentiating between 
the options. We therefore created option sets that contained either unique positive and shared 
negative features or unique negative and shared positive features, respectively, to manipulate 
the valence of the salient features.  
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 aimed at testing the predictions of the Accentuation Model concerning a 
shift in the evaluation of the options in consequence of the exclusion one option. In 
Experiment 1, participants had to evaluate and choose between three different word puzzles 
they subsequently had to solve.   
Methods 
Participants. A total of 220 participants (58% female, Mage = 26, 76% students) 
agreed to volunteer in exchange for performance dependent payment between CHF 10 (ca. 
US$ 9 at that time) and CHF 25 (ca. US$ 23). Average payment per participant was CHF 
13.70 (US$ 12.50). Participants were recruited via flyers in the university and through the 
participant pool of our laboratory.    
Materials. For the three options in the choice set, we formulated six positive features 
and six negative features (see Table 1). Each of the options was comprised of two positive 
and two negative features. For the condition “positive salient”, positive features were 
randomly selected but the negative features were the same for all three options (“is difficult”, 
“can easily be frustrating”). For the condition “negative salient,” negative features were 
selected and positive features were set to “is entertaining” and “enhances the vocabulary”. 
PART III: CONSEQUENCES OF RESTRICTION OF CHOICE 
 
57!
Table 1. Positive and Negative Features of the Options in Experiment 1 (German Original Wording in 
Parentheses) 
 
 
Positive Features Negative Features 
   
Feature group 1 … is appealing [ist reizvoll] ... is difficult [ist schwierig] 
 ... is creative [ist kreativ] ... is exhausting [ist anstrengend] 
 ... is entertaining [ist unterhaltsam] ... is irritating [ist verwirrend] 
   
Feature group 2 ... trains logical thinking [trainiert das 
Denken] 
... takes a fairly long time [dauert relativ 
lang] 
 ... improves vocabulary [fördert den 
Wortschatz] 
... can easily be frustrating [kann leicht 
frustrieren] 
 ... improves memory [schult das 
Gedächtnis] 
... has high time pressure [hat einen hohen 
Zeitdruck] 
 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in group sessions with up to four 
participants at a time. The experiment was run on computers using the software MediaLab 
(Jarvis, 2006). Participants were randomly assigned to the two experimental conditions. The 
total duration of the experiment was about 20 to 25 minutes.  
After participants signed an informed consent form, the instructions informed them 
that they would be offered a selection of three different word puzzles they could choose from 
later in the experiment. Moreover, they learned that before making the choice, they would 
first be asked to evaluate each of the options. After these instructions, a short demonstration 
of how the evaluation would take place was displayed: the three options were presented next 
to each other entitled with the names “Task A”, “Task B”, and “Task C”. The four attributes 
were presented under the task labels and started with the two positive attributes. Underneath 
each option a vertical slider was used to evaluate the attractiveness of each option anchored at 
0 at the bottom and 100 at the top. After this short demonstration, participants saw one slide 
with all three choice options presented simultaneous and were asked to rate their 
attractiveness. Upon completing these ratings the next slide appeared on the screen indicating 
that the rating would be transferred to a database, which would take some time. After 20 
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seconds a new slide displayed the message that one of the options had to be removed from the 
choice set as already enough evaluations for this option had been made and that for the 
remainder of the experiment only two options would be left to choose from. The exact 
wording of the message was as follows: “Attention. There are already enough evaluations for 
Task A. Therefore, Task A will be excluded from your choice set. We will ask you for new 
evaluations of Task B and Task C. This also means that you will only have the choice 
between Tasks B and C afterwards.” This message remained on the screen for 24 seconds. 
Participants then rated the remaining two options again and then indicated their choice. 
Several short questionnaires were then administered for exploratory reasons3 before 
participants had the opportunity to solve the task they had chosen, a word puzzle that was in 
fact identical for all participants regardless of their choice. A 4 x 4 version of boogle (a letter 
matrix with the task to find as many words as possible) was used as puzzle. After finishing 
the puzzle, participants were paid according to how many words they found in the puzzle, 
thanked and debriefed.  
Results 
As a manipulation check, we compared the attractiveness ratings of the initial 
presentation between the positive salient and the negative salient condition. Mean 
attractiveness of the three options scored higher in the positive salient condition than in the 
negative salient condition (M = 68.84 vs. M = 54.82; p < .001, d = 2.24)
4
. As expected, then, 
participants seemed to focus more on the unique than on the shared features, which supports 
the effectiveness of our manipulation.  
To test our predictions about the consequences of the exclusion of one option, we 
calculated for the two remaining options the change in attractiveness before and after the 
exclusion and averaged these change measures. Figure 4 shows the means and the confidence 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 As none of the questionnaires yielded interesting results pertaining to the hypotheses of this study, they are not 
reported here. 
4 We used robust statistical methods to analyze the data (20%-trimmed means and percentile bootstrapping, see 
Wilcox & Keselman, 2003) 
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intervals of the change scores for the two experimental conditions. Both change scores deviate 
from 0, indicating an impact of the exclusion on the evaluations. As predicted, the negative 
salient condition profited more from the exclusion than the positive salient (p < .05; d = 0.4).   
 
Figure 4. Change in Evaluation for the Conditions Negative Features Salient vs. Positive Features Salient (Error 
Bars Represent 95% Confidence Intervals). 
However, the absolute scores followed only partially our predictions. In both 
conditions, a positive change score was found, signaling an increase in attractiveness due to 
the exclusion. This increase was expected for the condition where negative attributes were 
particularly salient and the comparisons with the specific disadvantages of the excluded 
option was predicted to enhance the attractiveness of the remaining options. In contrast, for 
the condition where positive attributes were particularly salient, a negative change score was 
expected, as the comparison with the specific advantages of the excluded option was 
predicted to lower the attractiveness of the remaining options. Results confirmed the first 
prediction only. We will address this issue in the general discussion. 
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that the exclusion of an option affects the 
evaluation of the remaining options. In Experiment 1, only general shifts in the evaluation of 
the remaining options could be predicted but not the final preference between the remaining 
options because the features of the options did not refer to the same dimensions and were 
hence not directly comparable. Therefore, the aim of Experiment 2 was to use attributes on 
shared dimensions in order to be able to test predictions about the preferences for the 
remaining options. Experiment 2 emulated a website that offers the possibility to rate 
professors or courses at a university on different dimensions such as content, interestingness, 
effectiveness, or workload. We set up a vignette internet study in which students were able to 
read the ratings of three different courses in order to choose their course for the next semester. 
The prediction was that the exclusion of one of the courses from the choice set determines the 
preference among the remaining options. If positive features are salient in the excluded 
course, the course closest to the excluded option on the shared features should be preferred. If 
negative features are salient in the excluded course, the option most dissimilar to the excluded 
one should be chosen.  
Methods 
Participants. Students (N = 351; 43% female; Mage = 22) of the ETH Zurich 
(Technical University of Zurich) volunteered to participate in this experiment, which was part 
of a larger study. 
Materials. The choice set consisted of three different courses described on three 
positive and three negative dimensions. The sum of all ratings was equal for all three options. 
As in Experiment 1, two different conditions were designed with either unique positive and 
shared negative features (positive salient condition) or unique negative and shared positive 
features (negative salient condition). As shown in Table 2, positive numbers indicated ratings 
for positive dimensions and negative numbers indicated ratings for negative dimensions.  
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Table 2. Attribute Dimensions and Ratings for Salient Positive Condition and Salient Negative Condition in 
Experiment 2 (Original German Wording in Parentheses) 
 
 
Salient Positive Features 
 
 
 
Salient Negative Features 
  
Course 
A 
 
Course 
B 
 
Course 
C 
 
 
Course 
A 
 
Course 
B 
 
Course 
C 
        
Clarity [Verständlichkeit] +5 +3 +2  +3 +3 +3 
Fun [Spass] +4 +3 +6  +5 +5 +5 
Interest  
[Interesse] 
+2 +5 +3  +3 +3 +3 
        
Work load  
[Arbeitsaufwand] 
-2 -2 -2  -4 -2 -1 
Time expenditure  
[Zeitaufwand] 
-4 -4 -4  -3 -2 -5 
Teacher-student ratio 
[Betreuungsverhältnis] 
-3 -3 -3  -2 -5 -3 
        
 
Moreover, each course scored on one dimension a particularly high (low) rating which 
differed from the other courses by two rating points. This was to highlight the main advantage 
or disadvantage, respectively, of each course – and thus to increase their salience. According 
to our hypothesis, these salient features within each option should determine the shift of 
preference due to the exclusion. For example, let us first consider the condition where the 
positive features were particularly salient in the left column of Table 2: If course A was 
excluded , the remaining courses should be evaluated especially with respect to “clarity” as 
“clarity” is the highlighted feature of course A. This accentuated dimension favors course B 
over course C, thus, fosters preference for course B. If course B was excluded, the “interest” 
dimension should be accentuated and preference should shift to course C. In the condition 
where the negative features were particularly salient (right column of Table 2), an exclusion 
of course A accentuates “work load” and should lead to a preference for course C. An 
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exclusion of course B should shift preferences towards course A due to an accentuation of 
“time expenditure”. Table 3 lists a summary of the predictions. We administered three 
different orderings of the courses on the display to control for position effects. 
 
Table 3. Summary of the Predicted Preference Shifts in Experiment 2 
  
Excluded Option Predicted Preference 
   
Positive Features Salient  A B > C 
 B C >A 
 C A > B 
   
Negative Features Salient  A C > B 
 B A > C 
 C B > A 
 
Procedure. Participants were instructed to imagine that they were facing a choice 
between three university courses for the next semester, which were equivalent in terms of 
study requirements. To help them in their choice, they were told they would see the ratings of 
the courses by former students. Ratings of the courses would range form -6 (very bad) to 0 
(neutral) for disadvantages and from 0 to +6 (very good) for advantages. Participants were 
also told that for some of them, the choice set had to be restricted to two options only. They 
then were randomly assigned to either the full choice set (three options) or the restricted 
choice set (two options) and to either the salient positive or the salient negative condition. The 
condition with full-blown choice sets was included as a control condition. In the restricted 
choice set condition, a frame around two options indicated which options to choose from. 
Participants were than asked to indicate their choice.  
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Results 
Order of presentation had no influence and we collapsed the data across these 
conditions in the following analyses. As shown in Table 4, participants preferred in the full-
blown choice set both in the salient positive and the salient negative condition the course B. 
Note, however, that courses were not comparable across conditions as they had different 
ratings. It seemed that regarding the positive features, students put more weight on “interest” 
than on “clarity” with the least important feature of a course being “fun”. Among the negative 
features, a bad teacher-students ratio was perceived as more important than “work load” with 
“time expenditure” being the least important. 
 
Table 4. Course Preference for the Unrestricted Choice Set in Experiment 2 
Valence of Salient Features 
 Negative Positive 
   
Course A 28 
(35%) 
23 
(29%) 
Course B 39 
(48%) 
50 
(62%) 
Course C 14 
(17%) 
7 
(9%) 
 
For our main analysis, we coded for each condition and each excluded option 
regarding to whether the preference followed our prediction. Confirming our hypothesis and 
as shown in Table 5, in all but one conditions the predicted option was more likely to be 
selected than the alternative option. Overall, in 56% of the cases participants chose the 
predicted option, which represents a significant deviation from chance (!2 = 2.8, p  < .05 (one-
sided), w2 = 0.02). Participants’ preferences were therefore shifted to a small but reliably 
degree according to our predictions.  The close match between the pattern of choices observed 
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and the pattern of choices predicted by the Accentuation Model indicates that participants put 
more weight on the dimension highlighted by the excluded option.  
 
Table 5. Preference for Either the Predicted or the Alternative Option in Experiment 2  
Preference  
Valence of Salient 
Features Excluded Course Alternative Predicted Total 
A 17 
(53%) 
15 
(47%) 
32 
B 9 
(43%) 
12 
(57%) 
21 
C 17 
(44%) 
22 
(56%) 
39 
Negative 
Total 43 
(47%) 
49 
(53%) 
92 
A 7 
(26%) 
20 
(74%) 
27 
B 18 
(47%) 
20 
(53%) 
38 
C 15 
(47%) 
17 
(53%) 
32 
Positive 
Total 40 
(41%) 
57 
(59%) 
97 
 
Discussion 
In this paper, we argue that the exclusion of an option from a choice set has systematic 
consequences on the evaluation of the remaining options as well as on the choice between the 
remaining options. Two experiments supported the main hypotheses derived from the 
Accentuation Model by Ritter and Freund (2009a). 
Experiment 1 showed differential effects of the exclusion of an option depending on 
the valence of the salient features in the choice set. As hypothesized, the remaining options 
were enhanced in their attractiveness when one option was excluded from a set of options 
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with salient negative features. In comparison with the excluded option, the remaining options 
were not burdened with the same disadvantages, which made them appear more attractive. 
The model also predicts that, when positive features are particularly salient in the excluded 
option, the remaining options should decrease in attractiveness. Experiment 1 did not confirm 
this hypothesis. One reason why this effect was not found might have been the specific 
advantages used together with the context of the decision. Participants in this study were 
instructed that they would have a choice between several word puzzles and that they would 
receive performance-contingent payment. The form of payment was especially emphasized to 
increase the involvement with the decision of participants. Therefore, the main goal of 
participants might have been to achieve an optimal performance in the puzzle in order to 
make as much money as possible. With this goal in mind, the advantages used in the 
descriptions were rather irrelevant. For example, whether one improves one’s memory or is 
entertained by the task is at least not directly related to one’s performance. Due to the lack of 
relevance of the advantages with respect to the supposed primary goal of increasing payment 
after the experiment, the advantages might have been perceived as too weak and hence not 
have exerted a strong influence on the evaluations. The disadvantages, however, were rather 
significant with respect to the goal to perform as well as possible. Particularly difficulty and 
time pressure might have been perceived in conflict with the goal to display an optimal 
performance in order to make more money during the experiment.  
Experiment 2 replicated and extended findings of Experiment 1. Using features to 
describe the options in the choice set that imply a rank order among them, allowed to test the 
prediction of a systematic shift in the preference. Results confirmed predictions derived from 
the Accentuation Model (Ritter & Freund, 2009a). After the exclusion of an option with 
salient negative features, the least similar option was chosen, whereas after the exclusion of 
an option with salient positive features, the most similar option was preferred. 
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The effect of the exclusion in Experiment 2 was statistically significant but of rather 
modest size. Note, however, that the manipulations used in this study were also very subtle. 
First, the exclusion was not directly experienced but only sketched. Participants were told that 
they would have either the full choice or a restricted choice, but infact, they did not have all 
the options first and and then lost one option in the course of the experiment. Second, the 
salience of features within the options was created by a 2-point scale difference as opposed to 
a 1-point difference. Future tests of this model will have to show whether stronger 
manipulations will cause stronger effects. 
The Accentuation Model attempts at providing an account of the cognitive processes 
underlying judgments and preferences. The focus on the cognitive underpinnings offers a 
flexible and fruitful approach to investigate various effects in judgment and decision making 
(cf., Mussweiler, 2003a; Tversky, 1977). Especially research on the general benefits and costs 
of choice would profit from including process models on the cognitive underpinnings of their 
effects in their research and not rely solely on motivational explanations. As an example, 
consider the too-much-choice effect (e.g., Sheena S. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). An 
extrapolation of the perspective adopted in this paper could be that in extensive as opposed to 
restricted choice sets, the focus lies more on the negative than on the positive features. If 
people experience relief when an option is excluded from a large choice set it might be in part 
because they see the remaining options in a better light. Similarly, the classic reactance effect, 
that one is upset if one’s choice among attractive options is restricted, might also be due to a 
less favorable perception of the remaining options as a consequence of the restriction. Taken 
together, we maintain that the Accentuation Model might offer a fruitful perspective on the 
cognitive processes involved in making judgments and decisions.  
The current paper does not provide a full test of the model but adds to the evidence 
supporting this model (Ritter & Freund, 2009b). In both experiments we manipulated the 
valence of the salient features directly by making either solely the positive features or solely 
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the negative features discriminative – a situation hardly to be found in real life. What are the 
conditions in real life that influence whether one focuses more on the positive or more on the 
negative features of one’s options? The overall outcome expectation – whether one expects to 
make a choice between generally positive vs. generally negative options – might direct the 
focus of attention on either the advantages or the disadvantages (cf., Ritter & Freund, 2009a). 
Future research will need to address this question as well as further implications of these 
cognitive processes on decision satisfaction and potential regret. 
 !
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General Discussion 
This thesis treated the consequences of a restriction of choice with a focus on the 
cognitive processes stipulated by the restriction. In the general discussion I will summarize 
and discuss the findings presented in Part I to Part III and raise some further questions. I will 
outline several implications of the presented theoretical account on related research topics 
such as the selection of goals and too-much choice. I will also address interindividual 
differences that might play a role in this context and present practical implications of this 
research.  Finally, I will provide an outlook as to which future directions this research could 
take.  
Discussion of Findings From Part I to Part III 
Taken together, Part I to Part III encompass the presentation of a novel theoretical 
model on the consequences of a restriction of choice and its embedding within existing 
accounts on judgments and comparisons (Part I) as well as the empirical testing of its main 
assumptions (Part II and Part III). To summarize the findings, I will refer to the graphical 
representation of the model in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. The Accentuation Model on the consequences of a restriction of choice as used in Part III. 
 
(1) We found that the exclusion of an option from a set of options leads to a recall 
advantage for the features of the excluded option over the features of the remaining 
options (Part II, Studies 1 and 2).  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
70!
(2) We found that the exclusion of an option has an impact on the evaluation of the 
remaining options. More specifically, we found that the exclusion of an option 
from a set in which the negative features are especially salient increases the 
perceived attractiveness of the remaining options more than the exclusion of an 
option from a set in which the positive features are especially salient (Part III, 
Study 1). 
Moreover, we found that choice among the remaining options is shifted due to the 
salient features of the excluded option. If the especially salient feature in the 
excluded option was positive, the one option was more likely to be selected that 
was most similar to the excluded option on the dimension of the salient feature. If 
the especially salient feature in the excluded option was negative the one option 
was more likely to be selected that was most dissimilar to the excluded option on 
the dimension of the salient feature (Part III, Study 2). In summary, we found that 
effects of the exclusion on evaluations and choices depend on the salient features 
of the excluded option. 
 
The following table puts these findings in relation to the hypotheses concerning the 
consequences of the exclusion of an option as formulated in Part I: 
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Table 6. Summary of Hypotheses and Empirical Results of this Thesis  
Hypothesis  Empirical Result 
Higher cognitive accessibility of the excluded option 
as compared to the remaining options 
 Higher recall probability for features of the excluded 
option as compared to features of the remaining 
options 
Shifts in the evaluations and choices depending on 
the salient features of the excluded option 
 Diverging shifts in evaluations and choices in sets 
with salient positive features as compared to salient 
negative features  
Increase in attractiveness of remaining options 
in sets with salient negative features  
 Higher attractiveness ratings for the remaining 
options after the exclusion 
Decrease in attractiveness of remaining options 
in sets with salient negative features 
 Slightly higher attractiveness ratings for the 
remaining options, but less than in the 
condition with salient negative features  
Choice of most similar option with respect to 
the salient feature of the excluded option in sets 
with salient positive features 
 Higher choice probability for the option 
favored on the accentuated feature dimension 
Choice of most dissimilar option with respect 
to the salient feature of the excluded option in 
sets with salient negative features 
 Higher choice probability for the option 
favored on the accentuated feature dimension 
General outcome expectations determine whether 
positive or negative features are salient 
 Not tested in this thesis 
   
 
As the summary of results in Table 6 shows, the reported studies provide good initial 
support for the assumptions of the Accentuation Model. The Accentuation Model states that 
the exclusion of an option leads to a re-evaluation of the remaining options in asymmetrical 
comparisons with the excluded option as a standard. For the excluded option to function as a 
standard in these re-evaluations, its cognitive accessibility has to be increased as compared to 
the remaining options. This was confirmed by the two studies in Part I.  
If the excluded option has the role of a standard in the evaluations of the remaining 
options, then the salient features of the excluded option (as the standard) will set the featural 
focus and reference points for these re-evaluations. This assumption has two implications for 
the re-evaluations: First, features that are especially salient within the excluded option will 
dominate these evaluations. And second, the features of the remaining options will be 
perceived in relation to the reference points set by the standard. Building on these 
assumptions, the Accentuation Model predicts divergent consequences of the exclusion for 
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sets of options with salient positive vs. salient negative features: For salient negative features, 
the remaining options should increase in attractiveness to the degree that they do not share the 
same disadvantages with the excluded option. The results of Study 1 in Part III support this 
prediction. For salient positive features, the remaining options should decrease in 
attractiveness to the degree that they do not share the same advantages with the excluded 
option. This prediction was not supported by the study. Instead also an increase in 
attractiveness after the exclusion was found. This increase was small in contrast to the set 
with salient negative features but still reliable. As discussed in Part III, this deviating result 
might have been caused be the specific positive features used in this study in combination 
with the goals of the participants. However, future research will have to further address this 
deviating result. 
The expected setting of a featural focus by the standard was observed in Study 2 of 
Part III. As explained above, the featural focus hypothesis states that features that are salient 
within the standard should receive more weight in the evaluation than others. By making 
always one dimension especially salient within each option, we could derive specific 
predictions for the choice among the remaining options depending on which option was 
excluded.  Participants in this study were more likely to choose the option that was favored by 
the accentuated dimension than the alternative. 
On the theoretical level, this means that the central idea of the Accentuation Model, 
namely, that the excluded option takes the role of a standard in the evaluation of the 
remaining options, received empirical support from both sides: The results of Part II confirm 
the antecedents condition for the excluded option to be selected as a standard; and the results 
of Part III reveal the predicted consequences that could be expected, when the excluded 
option serves as a standard. However, the evidence provided remains of somewhat indirect 
nature and it remains an open question, whether the reported pattern of consequences can also 
be explained by a different theoretical approach.  
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Critical to the results as whole, are especially two issues: First, antecedence conditions 
and consequences have not been assessed within the same study. And second, the context 
parameters that might determine whether the positive vs. the negative features are especially 
salient in a choice set have not been investigated (see last row in Table 6). I will address both 
issues in the following section. 
Strengths and Limitations 
In this thesis, a novel perspective on the consequences of a restriction of choice has 
been developed and spelled out in a process model. The presented account was able to derive 
very specific predictions for the consequences of the exclusion of an option. The theoretical 
approach integrated research on similarity and choice processes and addressed a rather 
uninvestigated problem of restriction of choice. In a series of studies initial support was found 
for the basic assumptions and central predictions of this model. Nevertheless, a number of 
open questions and critical issues remain – both on the theoretical and on the empirical level – 
some of which I will address in this section. 
Theoretical Issues 
The Role of Target and Standard in Asymmetrical Comparison. As the literature 
review in Part I revealed, theoretical assumptions and empirical findings are not homogenous 
in the field of asymmetric comparison (cf., Aguilar & Medin, 1999). In his seminal 
contribution, Tversky (Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978) made the case that in target-
standard comparisons, “one naturally focuses” on the target (Tversky, 1977, p. 333), giving 
the features of the target more weight in the judgment. Other authors in succession, however, 
emphasized the dominant role of the standard for the comparison process (e.g., Bowdle & 
Gentner, 1997; Medin et al., 1993; Ortony, 1979). The theoretical differences of these 
accounts have yet not been tested against each other. There is common ground, however, that 
the comparison outcome depends on the assignment of the elements of comparison to the 
roles of target and standard. 
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 Some researches have applied Tversky’s (1977) model to preferences (e.g., Houston 
et al., 1989; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Gibson, 1991). In their experiments, Houston and 
colleagues (Houston et al., 1989) presented a choice of two options to their participants and 
argued, that the second option would be the target and the first option the standard of 
comparison. Their rationale stated that due to order of presentation the focus of participants 
would lie on the option presented last, which would make it the target. The argumentation, 
thus, is based on a salience asymmetry. This is also the argumentation of this thesis. From this 
perspective, the work by Houston and colleagues integrates nicely in the presented research 
and differs only in the labeling of target and standard. 
Alignability of Features. An open question concerns the potential role of the 
alignability of the features that characterize the options. In general, alignable features are 
values on a common dimension (e.g., the price) whereas non-alignable features are values on 
a unique dimension, i.e., qualities that are or are not matched by the other options. The 
structural alignment account stresses the relevance of alignability for comparison processes 
(Gentner & Markman, 1994) and points to the different processing of features depending on 
their alignability (see also, Medin et al., 1995). Alignable features are easier to compare and 
are given more weight in similarity judgments than nonalignable features (Gentner & 
Markman, 1994; Markman & Gentner, 1996). Research by Johnson suggests that also in 
choices alignable features are given more weight (Johnson, 1984, 1986, 1989). Slovic and 
MacPhillamy (1974) presented participants with binary decisions involving both alignable 
and nonalignable features. Participants weighted the alignable information more, even when 
explicitly asked to not do so, and even when the nonalignable features were presented in a 
highly informative way. Furthermore, alignable features are more likely to be recalled than 
nonalignable features (Markman & Gentner, 1997; Zhang & Markman, 1998).  In general 
then, alignable features seem to be more relevant for the preference construction than 
nonalignable features. There is some indication, however, that in asymmetric comparisons, 
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nonalignable features produce stronger effects of direction of comparison (Sanbonmatsu et 
al., 1991).  
The Accentuation Model does not address the issue of alignability, but a few thoughts 
on the potential role of alignabiltiy for the presented research shall be outlined at this point. 
Nonalignability can have two causes: either real incomparability or incomplete information. 
Incomparability refers to the fact that one option posses a feature that the other option cannot 
posses in principle. This can be the case in choice sets including options from different 
product categories (generic compositions; Kotler, 1984). For example, when considering 
which one of two toasters to buy, the number of slots might be a relevant feature to compare. 
When considering whether to buy a toaster or an iron, the number of slots does not apply as a 
feature of comparison (cf., Medin et al., 1995). The other reason for nonalignability is the 
lack of explicit information for a specific feature for one of the options.  
In the case of incomparability, nonalignable features are irrelevant and will be left out 
of the comparison process, or transformed into more abstract features. A toaster with the right 
number of slots, for example, might be regarded as practical, making practicality a potential 
feature to compare. In the case of lack of information, the default inference of decision 
makers is that the option does not possess this specific feature. If one car is described as being 
very comfortable and the alternative option not, one generally assumes that the alternative is 
just not comfortable. In the case of incomparability, however, nonaligneable features are 
likely to be omitted in comparisons and thus without consequences in the context of 
restriction. For Accentuation Model, this means incomparable nonalignable features will fail 
to produce effects of the exclusion, whereas in principle comparable nonalignable features 
will produce even stronger effects because the contrast between target and standard is not 
only quantitative but categorical.  
Familiarity and Availability of Overall Evaluations. Another issue to be addressed is 
the degree of familiarity with the options and the availability of overall evaluations. Two very 
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general choice strategies can be distinguished: feature-based or dimensional comparison 
(dimensional processing) and holistic comparisons ((Bettman, 1979; Johnson, 1984; Russo & 
Dosher, 1983; Tversky, 1969). Despite the fact that many real life choice sets are organized 
by alternatives – e.g., products by brands, job candidates by dossiers, etc. (cf., Russo & 
Dosher, 1983) – people tend to prefer dimensional procession  (Russo & Dosher, 1983; 
Tversky, 1969). The degree to which overall evaluations of the options are available, 
however, diminishes the engagement in feature-based comparison (Bettman, 1979; Fazio, 
1986). In a study by Sanbonmatsu and colleagues (1991; Study 1) participants were either 
asked to form an overall evaluation of two options or to memorize the features of the options. 
The subsequent preference rating exhibited a stronger direction of comparison effect for the 
memory than for the evaluation condition. Participants in the evaluation condition were less 
likely to be affect by the specific constellation of unique features of the options, indicating 
that they were less engaged in feature-based comparisons.  
The relevance of these findings for the presented research is evident: The availability 
of overall evaluations might decrease the impact of the salient features of the excluded option. 
The effect of the exclusion should therefore be modulated by the availability of overall 
evaluations of the options. Especially when people are highly familiar with the options in a 
choice set, people might have established attitudes towards the options on which they base 
their decision. Under such circumstances, the effect of the exclusion might be less determined 
by the salient features of the excluded option and more by the overall evaluation.  
Related to the issue of the availability of overall evaluation is the issue of overall 
attractiveness of the excluded option. People spontaneously form preferences when 
confronted with options (e.g., Zajonc, 1980). These spontaneous initial preferences are likely 
to modulate the consequences of the exclusion. The Accentuation Model was explicitly 
formulated with the starting situation of equal overall attractiveness among the options in the 
initial choice set. This assumption bears also external validity as the loss of options might 
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most often occur due to indecisiveness and choice deferral, that is, in situations where people 
have no pronounced preferences. Nevertheless, this assumption represents a constraint to this 
model and limits its applicability. What consequences would pronounced preferences before 
the exclusion bear? A plausible assumption might be that when the excluded option is rather 
unattractive relative to the other options, the effect of the exclusion would cease because it 
would not belong to set of options under consideration – it would simply be irrelevant (cf., 
Fitzsimons, 2000). If, however, the excluded option is attractive enough to belong to the set of 
options under consideration, the effect of the exclusion might well be proportional to the 
degree of preference. The more pronounced the initial preference the smaller the effect of the 
exclusion. The rationale for this assumption is that pronounced preferences are  
On a more general theoretical level, a further specification of the Accentuation Model 
towards a mathematical model would be favorable to allow more specific testing of the 
predictions also by means of simulations. The development of such a formal approach is 
beyond the scope of this discussion, however. 
Empirical Issues 
Measure of Accessibility. As discussed in Part II, the employed incidental memory 
paradigm is not a pure measure of cognitive accessibility. As also pointed out in Part II, this 
fact should work against the effect, thus, making its detection harder. A test of the assumed 
effect with a more direct measure of accessibility would nevertheless be able to provide 
further empirical support. For example, the lexical decision paradigm could be employed to 
assess accessibility. In a potential study, participants could be asked to read descriptions of 
options that contain highly specific words. After the exclusion of an options, they would 
perform a lexical decision task with words from all of the descriptions, control words and 
non-words. Shorter response latencies for words related to the excluded option would indicate 
their enhanced accessibility. 
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Duration of the Effect. Another relevant question concerns the duration of the effect. If 
the exclusion makes the lost option more accessible, this effect might be temporally limited as 
other, counteracting processes might come into play. People’s regrets for past omissions and 
actions, for example, have been shown to change over time in strength and might ultimately 
dissolve (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Gilovich, Medvec, & Kahneman, 1998; Kahneman, 
1995). 
At this point, one could only speculate about specific duration of the effect is pure 
speculation, as in the two studies only short intervals have been used. Also in other paradigms 
on pervasive influences of past events on decisions, e.g. sunk costs (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), 
the duration of the effect remains an open question. Most important for the Accentuation 
Model, however, is the duration of the effect in relation to the timing of the decision. For long 
intervals between exclusion and decision, the impact of the exclusion might have ceased. This 
point will be readdressed in the section on practical implications of this research. 
Combined Testing of Accentuation Model. As pointed out in the summary of the 
findings, an important issue to address would be the combined testing of the assumption 
tested in Part I and the assumption tested in Part II. In combination these assumptions state 
that the shift in evaluation and preference caused by the exclusion of an option depends on the 
increased cognitive accessibility of the excluded option. A straightforward way to test this 
combined assumption could be implemented by a mediation analysis based on the assessment 
of both the option accessibility and the shift in evaluation within the same experiment. As a 
first step in this direction, an incidental memory task was administered for a subgroup of 
participants in the first experiment in Part II at the end of the session. The data obtained in 
this first attempt was not conclusive, however, as the recall variable contained too little 
variance.5 An improved version of the experiment would have to use a higher number of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The maximum of items to be recalled per option equaled two. A majority of participants failed to recall any 
features or recalled false features. The incidental memory task was administered after participants completed the 
boogle riddle, i.e., approximately 20 minutes after the exclusion of an option. 
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features per option and ask for the recall of attributes at an earlier point during the study. 
Evidence for a mediation of the consequences of an exclusion by the accessibility of the 
excluded option would provide strong support for the assumptions of the Accentuation 
Model.  
Contextual Determinants for the Valence of Salient Features. The role of the overall 
outcome expectations was addressed in Part I. Choice sets can be classified according to their 
overall valence as generally positive (“Finding the best among good options”) or generally 
negative (“Finding the least worst among bad options”). As stated in the Accentuation Model, 
this overall valence of the choice set should, other things being equal, determine the focus on 
the positive or negative features, respectively. People tend to avoid trade-offs between 
positive and negative features and focus primarily on either of them (Shafir et al., 1993). This 
focus renders the positive or the negative features salient within each option. In the studies 
reported in Part III, the salience was manipulated by using either unique positive and shared 
negative or unique negative and shared positive features. Future studies should address the 
role of overall expectations by omitting a direct manipulation of the salient features and 
instead use options sets with clear general valence. For example, choice sets could consist of 
pleasant vs. unpleasant tasks – for salient positive vs. salient negative features. For optimal 
comparability, the same dimensions should be used to describe the options in the sets. 
Another possibility would be to use the same options and manipulate the overall outcome 
expectations.  
Interindividual differences: What Some People Regret, Might Be Relieving to Others 
The scope of this research was on general cognitive mechanisms that are involved 
when choice is restricted. Such general mechanisms leave a considerable amount of variance 
unexplained that might be traced back to interindividual differences. Interindividual 
differences are not only of interest in order to reduce unexplained variance and carve out 
stronger effects, but might also hold information for further specifications of the processes, 
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thus, help advance the theory. Which kinds of individual differences might play a role in 
context of restriction of choice? In the following I will discuss two personality variables with 
theoretical associations with the discussed phenomena: maximizing and optimism/pessimism.  
Maximizing 
Schwartz (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2002), building on concepts developed by Simon 
(Simon, 1955), argued that people differ in the dispositional goals they pursue when making a 
choice. Some people have the goal to find the optimal option, i.e., to maximize the possible 
outcome of their decision. Other people strive to satisfice, i.e., find an options that meets their 
personal criterion. They are looking for a “good-enough option” that is acceptable in their 
subjective view. Satisficing as a dispositional decision strategy is associated with life-
satisfaction, optimism, and self-esteem whereas maximizing is associated with regret and 
depression (Schwartz et al., 2002). Interestingly, maximizers tend to achieve the objectively 
better outcomes but experience less satisfaction about these outcomes than satificers (S. S. 
Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006). The “absolute best”is merely an idealization without a 
real world representation. In other words, maximizers pursue an impossible goal.  People 
striving for the ever-best option continuously optimize their outcome – and thereby 
outperform satisficers. At the same time they miss their goal of achieving optimal option. 
Satisficers, on the other hand, are theoretically and practically able to achieve their goal in a 
choice situation. A realistic aspiration level secures that one finds an acceptable option. 
Maximizers rely more on external influences and social comparisons for evaluating the 
options. They also spend more time and effort on comparing the alternatives and are more 
concerned with options that they fail to pursue (S. S. Iyengar et al., 2006).  Inherent to a 
maximization strategy is the striving for a maximum number of options to choose from – 
every additional option nourishes the hope of finally encounter the optimal option. Under 
these considerations, it seems plausible to assume that maximizers would be more affected by 
a restriction of their choice than satisficers.  
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We assessed the maximizing tendency of participants in the studies in Part I and Part 
II using the German version of the maximizing scale (Greifeneder & Betsch, 2006; Schwartz 
et al., 2002). However, we did not find any reliable associations with the experimental effects. 
Our original exploratory hypothesis was that maximizers would show better recall for the 
excluded options and a more pronounced shift in evaluations especially for salient positive 
choice sets. For maximizers the increase in accessibility should further be fostered by the 
motivation to have as many options as possible. Furthermore, they should especially be 
affected by potential advantages they loose due to the restriction.  
The lack of associations between maximizing tendencies and the effects of restriction 
might at least partly be due to scale qualities of the maximizing scale that received serious 
criticism recently (Diab, Gillespie, & Highhouse, 2008). In fact, the alternative scale proposed 
by Diab and colleagues (2008) might be of interest for future investigations in the 
theoretically manifest association.  
Optimism and Pessimism 
Optimism and pessimism are two other dispositional variables that might be linked to 
the processes in the Accentuation Model. Optimism and pessimism are stable global 
expectations concerning the personal future (Scheier & Carver, 1992). Generalized 
expectations guide the attentional focus in the perception of potential outcomes (Trope & 
Liberman, 1996). Optimism is related to a focus on the positive sides of an outcome, and 
pessimism to the negative sides, respectively. We assessed optimism and pessimism in the 
studies reported in Part II and Part III using the revised Life Orientation Scale (LOT-R; 
Herzberg, Glaesmer, & Hoyer, 2006; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Our exploratory 
hypothesis was that optimism and pessimism would interact with the salience of the positive 
and negative features, respectively. We expected that optimistic persons would be especially 
responsive to positive features and pessimistic persons to negative features.  However, no 
such relation was found between these dispositional measures and the evaluations of the 
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options, nor with the effect of the exclusion. Potentially our focus manipulation using the 
unique-shared paradigm dominated the impact of generalized expectancies. In studies with 
more ambiguous material, however, dispositional expectancies might still be relevant. In fact, 
for choice sets that entail perfectly ambiguous options, dispositional optimism and pessimism 
might even account for divergent consequences of a restriction if the disposition directs the 
attentional focus on either the positive or the negative features.    
Embedding the Accentuation Model in Related Research Areas 
In this section the theoretical and empirical account presented in this thesis will be 
related to neighboring research areas and potential fields of application.  
Too-Much Choice 
Investigation on choice set sizes has revealed the potential of a proliferation of choice 
options to negatively affect the decision maker. “Hyperchoice” (Mick, Broniarczyk, & Haidt, 
2004) makes the decision process more difficult and leads to less commitment with the 
chosen option and less motivation to make the best out of one’s chosen path (Sheena S. 
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Too much choice can also foster choice deferral (Lancaster, 1990; 
C. M. White & Hoffrage, 2009). This research manifests a counterpart to economical 
rationale that more choice optimizes the match between supply and demand, thus, improves 
the individual satisfaction of needs (Lancaster, 1990). It also opposes the psychological allure 
of choice: people are motivated by having a choice (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1978), they prefer 
to choose themselves over letting somebody else choose for them (Botti & Iyengar, 2004) and 
they also attracted by more choice (Chernev, 2003).  
Following the literature on the effects of choice set sizes, it seems plausible that the 
number of options equally affects the consequences of a restriction. According to the 
Accentuation Model (Part I), a restriction is assumed to have positive consequences when the 
general focus is on the negative features, and negative consequences, when the general focus 
is on the positive features. Applying the Accentuation Model to the effects of choice set sizes 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
83!
would therefore require a connection between set size and valence of the salient features in 
the choice set. Let us assume that, in every choice set there is one optimal option. Basic 
sampling from a set of alternatives with different attractiveness would then predict a higher 
probability to choose a non-optimal option in larger choice set than in small choice sets. In 
other words, the base rate for making the wrong choice is higher in large choice sets than in 
small choice sets. In addition, larger choice sets tend to induce the aspiration of an ideal 
option (e.g., one option that is better than all the other options in every aspect). The idea of a 
hypothetical ideal option points to the deficits and shortcomings of every exiting option. 
Taken together, then, these points seem to imply that larger choice sets emphasize the 
negative features of the options stronger than do smaller choice sets. From the perspective of 
the Accentuation Model, then, restrictions in large choice sets should be more likely to lead to 
a positive shift in the evaluation of the options than restrictions among small choice sets. A 
similar prediction could be made based on the notion, that in larger choice sets the exclusion 
of an option reduces the complexity of the decision which acts as a relief on the decision 
maker. Information overload in decisions (e.g., Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974), however, 
is experienced primarily due to a large number of attributes per option and not due to an 
exuberant number of options (Malhotra, 1982). The divergent predictions concerning the 
consequences of a restriction in large vs. small choice sets is therefore a novel hypothesis that 
could be tested empirically by excluding options from small vs. large sets that contain options 
with both positive and negative features. In fact, the rationale sketched above entails also a 
novel explanation why options in a smaller choice sets can be perceived as more attractive 
than the same options larger choice set, thus, provides a new perspective on the too-much-
choice effect.   
Selection of Goals 
Research on decision making and choice often concentrates on consumer goods or 
similar items as objects of investigations. Also the studies in part two in this thesis makes use 
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of such objects. Nevertheless, not all our choices are concerned with objects in the narrower 
sense. Throughout the life span we are confronted with numerous choices between options 
that are more similar to goals than to objects. What instruments do I want to play? Which 
sport should I practice? Which career should I aspire?  In fact, the selection of goals is a 
central element of successful life-management (Freund & Baltes, 2002). Goals are 
motivational constructs that direct, organize and energize behavior (Austin & Vancouver, 
1996; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). Moreover, goals are knowledge structures that entail 
information about desired end states and potential means to attend them (Kruglanski, 1996). 
Of interest in this context are especially differences in the mental representations of goals due 
to motivational orientations. Research on approach and avoidance motivation has revealed 
that people differ in the way they mentally construal their goals. Avoidance motivated people 
focus primarily on potential negative consequence they try to circumvent, whereas approach 
motivated people focus on positive consequences they hope to experience (Nikitin & Freund, 
in press). Applying the Accentuation Model on these motivational orientations, leads to the 
interesting prediction that avoidance motivated people should suffer less under the exclusion 
of a potential goal from their choice set then approach motivated people because of the 
selective focus on the negative or positive aspects of their goals: For approach motivated 
people, the positive aspects of the excluded goal should render the remaining opportunities 
less attractive. For avoidance motivated people, the negative aspects of the excluded goal 
would enhance the attractiveness of the remaining opportunities. 
Life Span: Age Differences in the Reaction to Restrictions 
Systematic data on age differences in judgment and decision making is still a rather 
scarce and mostly limited to single paradigms. However, decisions in real life are made by 
people of different ages. Failing to take this central context variable into account limits the 
external validity of many findings especially with regard to the context sensitivity of 
decisions. Furthermore, the theory on decision making would profit from considering age 
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differences, as age can be regarded strong independent variable that can help uncover 
involved processes and mechanisms. 
This thesis did not address age differences of the consequences of a restriction. 
Nevertheless, a short sketch of a possible hypothesis shall be provided at this point. As 
extensive research has shown, older adults prove to be rather resilient concerning the 
adversities of aging. Despite of substantial declines in physical condition, health, mental 
capacities, and social resources, older people show no general decrease of life satisfaction and 
well-being. Older people are also more capable of dealing with blocked goals and setbacks. 
With this background, the assumption seems plausible, that older people as opposed to 
younger people are less likely to experience a restriction of their choice negatively. Different 
processes might be involved in such a higher tolerance for restriction in older age. From the 
theoretical perspective of this thesis, one could speculate, that older adults have lower general 
outcome expectations. When facing a choice, older people might less expect to obtain a great 
outcome. Moreover, the general motivational orientation changes with age: Whereas younger 
people are more oriented towards gains and growth, old people try to maintain a certain level 
of functioning and prevent losses (Ebner, Freund, & Baltes, 2006; Freund & Ebner, 2005). 
Building on this basic motivational orientation in older adulthood, one could argue that older 
people should focus more on the negative aspects and possible threats that options might 
entail when making a decision. Note, however, that this does not imply a general vigilance 
towards negative stimuli as controversily discussed in the literature on a potential age-graded 
negativity bias (e.g., Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008). Older people might only then be oriented 
towards negative information, when it is relevant for their personal goals. This rationale leads 
to the prediction that older people should suffer less under restrictions of their choices than 
younger people. Such a mechanism could add up to other mechanisms that support the 
successful management of constraints and restricted opportunities in older age (e.g., Ebner et 
al., 2006).  
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Practical Implications of This Research 
This research aimed at showing and explaining the divergent consequences a 
restriction of choice might entail. What are the practical implications of this research? 
A main message of this research is, that the restriction of choice is not necessarily be 
experienced negatively. Can this be used by institutions and individual who have to or want to 
implement restrictions of choices (e.g., policy makers, retailers, etc.)? A very general 
guideline derived from this research for implementing a restriction is that, previous to the 
execution of the restriction, the focus should be drawn away from the individual advantages 
of the different alternatives and directed to their disadvantages. The less attractive the whole 
choice set is perceived, the less likely the restriction will decrease the attractiveness of the 
remaining options. In the marketing context, the applicability of this general strategy is 
obviously limited as one hardly intents to make one’s products unattractive. A more subtle 
strategy for this context would therefore be to take care that the most remarkable features of 
the to-be-excluded option are matched at least by one other option.  
Another practical question concerns the prevention of the influence by an excluded 
option on one’s decisions. From a rational perspective, the impact of the excluded option is 
undesirable and constitutes a bias in decision making. Also in some real life situations, we 
might want to prevent such an impact and make a sound decision based only on the currently 
available options. An intentional effort is unlikely to stop the pervasive influence of the 
exclusion. In fact, trying to forget about the excluded option might even entail the contra-
intended consequence of making it even more accessible (Wegner & Erber, 1992). One 
potential solution might lie in the limited duration of the effect as mentioned above. If one has 
enough time for the decision, the best might be to wait until the increased accessibility of the 
excluded option has “worn off”. 
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The Functional Perspective: What Might These Processes Be for? 
This thesis adopted a bottom-up perspective by focusing on the cognitive processes 
and mechanisms that are entailed by the loss of an option. Questions concerning the 
adaptivity or functionality of the described processes were not explicitly addressed in this 
thesis, neither as an explanatory theoretical background nor as a research goal. Nevertheless, 
following the tenet of William James (1890, p. 333) as well as the modern situated cognition 
approach (e.g., Schwarz, 2009; Smith & Semin, 2004), “[My] thinking is first and last and 
always for the sake of [my] doing.” Therefore, the question can be asked, what are the 
implications for the broader perspective of behavior regulation? How does the described 
cognitive process serve an adaptive reaction to the environment and the attainment of goals?  
Recent functional approaches on counterfactual thinking (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 
2008; Marcel Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007) stress the role of these cognitions for behavior 
regulation. Counterfactuals are thoughts that represent an alternative to past events, thoughts 
about what might have been (Roese, 1997). Such thoughts can have an affective, motivational 
and an informational impact. They can inform about what would have to change to achieve a 
better outcome, they can motivate to put more effort, and they can also make content about 
the factual course of events.  
In a similar vein, it could be argued, the enhanced accessibility of the excluded option 
servers ultimately a learning and optimizing function to prevent future omissions and 
mistakes. A pure present/future-oriented perception of choices might not be adaptive with 
respect to the long-term consequences. However, it must also be considered that the observed 
impact on evaluations and choices might just represent a dysfunctional side effect or 
overgeneralization of an otherwise adaptive mechanism.  
Future Research 
This discussion has raised numerous issues that future research should address – to 
further the empirical support for the Accentuation Model, but also to extend its application to 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
88!
related research areas.  Concerning the empirical support, I see mainly three different kinds of 
studies that should be addressed: First, the assessment of cognitive accessibility of the 
excluded option by a different method, as discussed above; second, a combined study that 
supports the causal role of the enhanced accessibility for the consequences of the exclusion 
(via a mediation analysis, as discussed above). And finally, studies that investigate more 
potential consequences of the restriction. For example, in experimental paradigms where one 
options is excluded out of set of four options, the exclusion could lead to preference reversals 
depending on which option is excluded. 
Concerning the application of the Accentuation Model to related research areas, I am  
most interested in investigating the moderating effects of choice set sizes and age-differences 
as elaborated above. 
Conclusion 
The bottom line of this thesis states that the loss of a previously available option 
affects the evaluation of the remaining options and has an impact on the subsequent choice 
among them. Moreover this impact can be traced back to basic cognitive principles that allow 
specific predictions concerning evaluations and choices after a restriction.   
This research extends previous work on the effects of added options and it provides 
new perspectives on current questions in the field of judgment and decision making. 
Hopefully, it can contribute to our understanding of human decisional processes and might 
ultimately help to support individuals in making sound decisions.   
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Appendix 
Attributes used to describe cars in Part II, Study 1 : 
DARO: exciting [aufregend], spacious [geräumig], down-to-earth [unkkompliziert], original 
[originell], agile [wendig] 
NILO: powerful [krafvoll], innovative [innovativ], comfortable [komfortabel], irresistible 
[unwiderstehlich], compact [kompakt] 
KETO: up-to-date [zeitgemäss], distinctive [unverwechselbar], prestigious [edel], dynamic 
[dynamisch], high-quality [hochwertig] 
Attributes used to describe cars: 
OSLO: high-quality [hochwertig], stylish [stilvoll], shapely [formschön], extravagant 
[extravagant], pithy [prägnant] 
SOFIA: perfect in form [formvollendet], exquisit [exquisit], mundane [mondän], tasteful 
[geschmackvoll], balanced [ausgewogen] 
RIGA: sleek [geschmeidig], up-to-date [zeitgemäss], original [originell], spruce [schmuck], 
top-quality [qualitätsvoll] 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation untersucht die Konsequenzen des Verlusts einer Option bei 
Entscheidungen. Die zentrale Forschungsfrage dabei lautet: Wie beeinflusst der Ausschluss 
einer Option die Wahrnehmung der verbleibenden Optionen und die letztendliche 
Entscheidung für eine dieser verbleibenden Optionen?  
Diese Frage wird im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit ausgehend von einer kognitiven 
Perspektive und einem Fokus auf die informationsverarbeitenden Prozesse, die durch den 
Ausschluss angestossen werden, untersucht. Dazu wird im ersten Teil der Arbeit ein 
theoretisches Modell entwickelt, das Prinzipien der kognitiven Psychologie und der 
Urteilsforschung integriert. Die zentrale Idee dieses Modells besagt, dass die ausgeschlossene 
Option als Vergleichsstandard zur Bewertung der verbleibenden Optionen herangezogen 
wird. Im zweiten und dritten Teil der Arbeit werden diese Annahmen im Rahmen von vier 
experimentellen Studien untersucht.  
Die drei zentralen Annahmen und ihre empirische Überprüfung wird im folgenden 
erläutert:  
Anname 1: Der Ausschluss führt dazu, dass die ausgeschlossene Option eine, 
gegenüber den anderen Optionen erhöhte, kognitive Zugänglichkeit aufweist.  Diese 
Annahme wird insbesondere im zweiten Teil der Arbeit unter Verweis auf grundlegende 
kognitive Prinzipien begründet.  
Unter Verwendung eines Incidental-Memory Paradigmas, in dem die 
Versuchspersonen nach dem Ausschluss einer ursprünglich zur Verfügung stehenden 
Alternative gebeten wurden, sich an möglichst viele Merkmale aller Optionen zu erinnern, 
zeigte sich in zwei experimentellen Studien mit unterschiedlichem Stimulusmaterial 
hypothesenkonform, dass die Merkmale der ausgeschlossenen Optionen mit einer höheren 
Wahrscheinlichkeit erinnert werden als die der verbleibenden Optionen.  
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Annahme 2: Die erhöhte kognitive Zugänglichkeit führt dazu, dass die 
ausgeschlossene Option als Standard in Vergleichprozessen fungiert, die den Bewertungen 
der verbleibenden Optionen zugrunde liegt. Die Bewertung der verbleibenden Optionen 
unterscheidet sich vor und nach dem Ausschluss in Abhängigkeit davon, ob bei der 
ausgeschlossenen Option insbesondere negative oder positive Merkmale salient sind: Bei 
salienten negativen Merkmalen sollten die verbleibenden Optionen nach dem Ausschluss 
positiver als zuvor wahrgenommen werden, bei salienten positiven Merkmalen hingegen 
negativer.  
Diese Effekte wurden in einer Studie, in der die Valenz der salienten Merkmale 
manipuliert wurde, zumindest teilweise belegt. Entsprechend der Vorhersage unterschied sich 
die Veränderung der Bewertungen in Abhängigkeit von der Valenz der salienten Merkmale. 
Allerdings zeigte sich neben dem vorhergesagten Zugewinn an Attraktivität für saliente 
negative Merkmale auch bei salienten positiven Merkmalen ein minimaler Zugewinn. 
Mögliche Gründe für diese Abweichung liegen in dem spezifischen Stimulusmaterial. 
Annahme 3: In den Vergleichsprozessen bestimmen die salienten Merkmale des 
Vergleichsstandards, welche Merkmale der verbleibenden Optionen für die Bewertung 
besonders relevant sind. Gleichzeitig liefern die salienten Merkmale des Vergleichsstandards 
einen Referenzpunkt zur relativen Bewertung der korrespondierenden Merkmale der 
verbleibenden Optionen.  
In einer Studie mit speziell gestaltetem Stimulusmaterial, in dem stets eine 
Merkmalsdimension pro Option hervorgehoben wurde, führte der Ausschluss einer Option 
tatsächlich zu einer systematischen Verschiebung der Präferenz für eine der verbleibenden 
Optionen. 
In der abschliessenden Diskussion wird das theoretische Modell im Hinblick auf die 
gefundenen Ergebnisse bewertet. Mögliche zukünftige Forschungsansätze zur weiteren 
Untersuchung der Modellannahmen werden hierbei aufgezeigt. Daneben wird das Modell im 
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Kontext anderer Forschungsgebiete wie z.B. “Hyper choice“ und die Auswahl von Zielen 
diskutiert und auf praktische Implikationen der zentralen untersuchten Fragestellung 
eingegangen. 
  
 
